Recent Developments by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 46 Issue 6 Article 8 
1978 
Recent Developments 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Developments, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1273 (1978). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol46/iss6/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Commercial Paper-Fictitious Payee Rule Unnecessary for Double
Forgery To Be Treated as Forged Check Loss.-The widespread use of
checks in our society' and the substantial losses caused by forgeries2 have
made the problem of allocating the losses due to these check frauds among
innocent parties an important one. The Uniform Commercial Code has
established relatively definite rules of liability for the various types of check
frauds, and much of the law in this area is quite settled. Generally, when
there has been a forgery of the signature of a check's drawer (a forged check)
or of the signature of the named payee (a forged indorsement), the drawee
bank cannot charge its customer for the amount of the check 3 In the case of a
forged indorsement, the drawee bank can usually pass the loss back to prior
parties in the collection chain so that the loss generally falls on the party who
took from the forger, or the forger himself.4 With a forged check, however,
1. A recent article estimates that there are perhaps 60 million checks processed daily in the
United States. See Murray, Price v. Neal in the Electronic Age: An Empirical Survey, 87
Banking L.J. 686, 688 & n.6 (1970). See also U.C.C. § 4-101, Comment; Dunne, Variation on a
Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform Commercial Code and the Checkless
Society, 75 Yale L.J. 788, 791 (1966); Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System,
20 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 574 (1968).
2. Annual losses caused by forgeries have been estimated at upward of 600 million dollars.
See O'Malley, Common Check Frauds and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 Rutgers L. Rev.
189, 189 & n.2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Check Frauds].
3. A bank can only charge its customers' accounts for "properly payable" items. U.C.C. §
4-401(1). The Code does not really define "properly payable" adequately, although it does provide
that" '[piroperly payable' includes the availability of funds for payment at the time of decision to
pay or dishonor." Id. § 4-104(1)(i). Under pre-Code law, a check was not properly payable if it
was not indorsed or if the indorsement was forged or unauthorized. See J. White & R. Summers,
Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 17-3, at 559 (1972). A forgery is
included in the Code definition of an unauthorized signature. U.C.C. § .1-201(43). A forged check
is not properly payable because the forgery is inoperative as the signature of the would-be
drawer, id. § 3-404(1), and "[n]o person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears
thereon," id. § 3-401(1). As to forged indorsements, a check drawn to the order of a payee
requires the payee's indorsement in order to be negotiated. Id. § 3-202(1). Since the forgery does
not operate as the payee's signature, id. § 3-404(1), there is no proper negotiation of the check so
as to make the transferee a holder, id. § 3-202(1). A holder is defined as "a person who is in
possession of . . . an instrument . . . drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to
bearer or in blank." Id. § 1-201(20). Only a holder or someone on his behalf can properly present
a check for payment. Id. § 3-504(1). See Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 6, 184 N.E.2d 358, 361 (1962).
As will be seen, a drawer may be precluded from asserting a forged drawer's signature against
its drawee bank, and may therefore attempt to pass the loss to prior parties in the collection
chain, Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977), or it may attempt to sue
directly the collecting or depositary bank. See notes 32, 37-38 infra and accompanying text.
4. The transferor of a check warrants that he has good title to it. U.C.C. §§ 3-417(i1(a),
4-207(1)(a). Because the forgery does not operate as the true payee's signature, good title to the
check cannot be passed. See, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482,
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the drawee bank is usually left with the loss 5 These general rules have
clarified prior law and defined a party's liability with a high degree of
certainty.6
This certainty fades, however, in the case of a "double forgery," where both
the drawer's and the payee's signatures are forged on the same check. In such
a case, whether the forgery is treated as a forged check or as a forged
indorsement is a crucial question because the rights of a drawee bank to
proceed against prior parties in the collection chain are determined by the
kind of forgery involved. The pre-Code majority rule had been that liability
was determined according to the rules for losses due to a forged check. 7 The
Code has no provisions specifically resolving this question, and there have
been few cases dealing with the problem.8
In the recent case of Perini Corp. v. First National Bank of Habersham
County, 9 the Fifth Circuit adopted the pre-Code majority view that the forged
indorsement is immaterial, and allocated the loss as if the only forgery was
that of the drawer's signature. The Perini Corporation maintained checking
accounts with two New York banks. Because it used a facsimile signature
machine to sign its checks, the corporation had passed a resolution authoriz-
ing the banks to honor all checks bearing the facsimile signature.' 0 This
490-91, 246 A.2d 162, 166-67 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (App.
Div. 1969); Society Nat'l Bank v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 2d 1, 5, 281 N.E.2d 563, 566
(1972); Whaley, Forgery and the Holder in Due Course: The Commercial Paper Puzzle, 78 Com.
L.J. 277, 277 (1973). Thus, the party who takes from the forger (or the forger himself) will be
ultimately liable for a breach of the statutory warranty of title.
5. U.C.C. § 3-418 states: "Except ... for liability for breach of warranty on presentment
under the preceding section, payment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder
in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on the payment."
6. It was noted, shortly after the Code had been adopted by most states, that it had been
somewhat successful in reducing litigation involving questions of forgery. O'Malley, The Code
and Double Forgeries, 19 Syracuse L. Rev. 36, 36 n.3 '1967) [hereinafter cited as Double
Forgeries].
7. See id. at 40.
8. Despite the dearth of case law in this area, the double forgery problem has been the subject
of considerable scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Check Frauds, supra note 2, at 244-47; Double
Forgeries, supra note 6; Palizzi, Forgeries and Double Forgeries Under Articles 3 and 4 of the
UCC, 42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 659 (1969); Whaley, Forgery and the Holder in Due Course: The
Commercial Paper Puzzle, 78 Com. L.J. 277, 282 (1973); Comment, Allocation of Losses from
Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62
Yale L.J. 417, 455, 459-60 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Allocation of Losses].
9. 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977).
10. The resolution authorized the banks "to honor all checks, drafts or other orders of
payment of money drawn in the name of Perini Corporation on its Regular Accounts . . . when
bearing or purporting to bear the single facsimile signature of R. A. Munroe . . . . said banks
shall be entitled to honor and charge Perini Corporation for all such checks, ... regardless of by
whom or by what means the actual or purported facsimile signature thereon may have been
affixed thereto, if such facsimile signature resembles the facsimile specimen from time to time
filed with said banks . . . ." 553 F.2d at 400.
A drawer and drawee can alter the bank's responsibility (in this case, the bank's otherwise
absolute liability for paying a forged check) by agreement so long as the agreement is reasonable,
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commercial convenience, however, led to disaster when someone apparently
used the machine'1 to run off over one million dollars worth of checks payable
to two fictitious companies, the Quisenberry Contracting Co. and the South-
ern Contracting Co. 12 The malefactor, Jesse D. Quisenberry, then deposited
the checks with the defendant Habersham bank in two company accounts he
had previously established, but indorsed the checks in his own name, not as
the representative of the two companies.' 3
Habersham's precautions in letting Quisenberry set up the accounts were
the subject of dispute for several reasons. Deposits of this size were uncom-
mon to Habersham, and Quisenberry's appearance, which included a mus-
tache that was noticeably attached by tape, 14 was quite unusual. Nonetheless,
no one at Habersham asked him to verify his identity or the companies for
which he had opened the accounts. One Habersham employee did run a credit
check on one of the companies and found that there was no evidence that the
business existed. 15 This information did not, however, deter Habersham from
crediting the checks to the company accounts and forwarding them to Perini's
drawee banks for final payment. During the next few weeks, the sums were
withdrawn, virtually depleting the company accounts. Some time after pay-
ment was made, Perini overdrew its accounts, discovered the forgeries, and
subsequently brought this action to recover the amounts of the checks.
in good faith, and the bank does not abrogate its duty of due care. U.C.C. § 4-103. See also
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 273 A.2d 266 (Del. 1971); Wal v. Hamilton
County Bank, 276 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1973); Transanerica Ins. Co. v. United States
Nat'l Bank, 276 Or. 945, 558 P.2d 328 (1976). In these cases, which involved corporate
resolutions similar to those in Perini, the courts held that the drawers were precluded from
denying the unauthorized signatures because of their agreements with the banks, and thus the
signatures were treated as valid within § 3-404(1) of the Code. A bank cannot, however, contract
away its liability for negligence. See, e.g., Gramore Stores, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 179
N.Y.L.J. 34, Feb. 21, 1978, at 14, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
11. It was not determined whether the signature was from the machine itself or merely an
exact duplicate. 553 F.2d at 401. There was also an issue regarding the extent of Perini's security
in guarding the machine. Id. at 400-01. Although the court granted summary judgment on most
issues against Perini, the issue of whether the depositary bank had been negligent in setting up
the accounts and processing the checks was left to be decided at trial. At the trial, Habersham
would be able to assert that Perini's negligence in its handling of the machine constituted
negligence under the Code, see notes 41-44 infra and accompanying text, possibly barring any
recovery Perini might otherwise have available to it, 553 F.2d at 407.
12. 553 F.2d at 401. The court noted that while the two companies in question might exist,
there were apparently no records of them. Id. at 402. Even if they did exist, however, the fact
that Perini had no outstanding obligation to them and that the forger obviously did not intend
them to receive the proceeds of the check made this point academic. Id. at 409, 412-16.
13. The checks were made out to the Quisenberry Contracting Co. and the Southern
Contracting Co., but the indorsements were made simply in the name of Jesse D. Quisenberny.
Id. at 401.
14. Id. at 402.
15. The Quisenberry Contracting Co. was not listed in either the phone book or the city
directory, and there was no business at all operating at the address Quisenberry provided the
bank. Id.
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A bank may not charge its customer's account for a check with a forged
drawer's or payee's signature because the check is not "properly payable."
2 6
Payment on such checks violates the bank's strict duty to pay checks only to
its depositor's order. 17 Paying a forged check would be paying a check not
ordered by the drawer and paying a check with a forged indorsement would
be paying a person whom the drawer has not ordered the bank to pay. Thus a
bank cannot charge a depositor's account for either a forged check or one with
a forged indorsement.18 Perini, however, was barred from asserting any
forged check claims against its drawee bank because of its corporate resolu-
tion authorizing the bank to honor all checks bearing the facsimile signa-
ture. 19 Its claims for recovery because of the forged indorsements similarly
failed because the court held that there was no forged indorsement liability at
all.20
In the case of a check, forged or otherwise, payment by a bank is final
when made in favor of a holder in due course or one who has "in good faith
changed his position in reliance on the payment. '21 In an attempt to bring
security to commercial transactions, the Code has adopted the time-honored
rule of Price v. Nea 22 that a drawee who makes payment on a forged check
cannot recover his payment. 23 A drawee bank must absorb the loss unless the
16. See note 3 supra.
17. The relationship between a bank and its depositor is one of debtor and creditor. Brigham
v. McCabe, 20 N.Y.2d 525, 530-31, 232 N.E.2d 327, 330, 285 N.Y.S.2d 294, 298 (1967); W.R.
Grimshaw Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 563 P.2d 117, 120 (Okla. 1977). The drawer
makes a deposit and the bank agrees to honor his order for making payments up to the amount of
deposit. Their contractual relationship requires that the bank pay out only in strict accordance
with the orders given it by its depositor-drawer. Wright v. Bank of Cal., Nat'l Ass'n, 276
Cal. App. 2d 485, 486, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (1969); Movie Films, Inc. v. First Security
Bank, 22 Utah 1, 4, 447 P.2d 38, 40 (1968) (bank's duty is to make no disbursements from Its
depositor's account except upon checks executed in the manner agreed to between the bank and
its depositor). Thus, a payment made by the bank on a forgery would not be chargeable to the
depositor since it was made without authority.
18. A bank's payment in such a case is considered to be out of its own pocket. W. R.
Grimshaw Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 563 P.2d 117, 120 (Okla. 1977); Jackson v. First
Nat'I Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 551, 403 S.W.2d 109, 112 (1966).
19. 553 F.2d at 403.
20. Id. at 412-16; see notes 94-103 infra and accompanying text.
21. U.C.C. § 3-418, quoted note 5 supra. The rule of finality specifically excepts liability for
breach of warranty, which generally comes up in forged indorsement situations. See notes 29-32
infra and accompanying text.
22. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
23. U.C.C. § 3-418, Comment 1. The original justification for this rule was that the drawee
was in the best position to recognize its customer's signature. Id. This is a rather outmoded notion
of a bank's ability to detect forgeries given the massive volume of checks processed every day. See
note 1 supra. For a study dealing with bank examinations of the signatures on checks, see
Murray, supra note 1, at 693-701. With the limited personal contact today, the only real
justification for the rule of Price v. Neal is the practical necessity of ending a commercial
transaction with speed and finality rather than setting aside a whole series of transactions. See
U.C.C. § 3-418, Comment 1; Double Forgeries, supra note 6, at 38 n. 10. This policy has served
to provide a great deal of security to the users of checks. See Murray, supra note 1, at 687-88.
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party has taken the check in bad faith, i.e., with knowledge of the forgery.2 4
Otherwise the Code finality of payment policy is applicable. The Perini court
rejected the contention that this policy applied only to drawee banks and not
to drawers, and held that there were no forged check claims against the
depositary and collecting banks because the Code's finality policy bars an
action once the drawee banks have made final payment on the checks.2 S
Under the Code, this policy cannot be circumvented by the assertion of
negligence, for one who meets the Code prerequisites cannot be liable for
negligence in dealing with forged checks unless the negligence amounts to bad
faith. 26
As noted, 2 7 a check with a forged indorsement is also not "properly
payable" since, by paying the wrong payee the bank has not paid to its
customer's order and thus has violated its contractual duty. Therefore, the
drawer cannot be charged for the amount of the check. The drawee bank is
not, however, generally left with the loss. 28 One who transfers a check
warrants that he has good title to the instrument. 29 Since a forgery is
inoperative as the true payee's signature, it is ineffective to pass title. 30 Thus,
a transferor who negotiates a check with a forged indorsement breaches his
statutory warranty of good title and subsequent transferees may bring actions
against any prior transferors. 3 1 The loss ultimately will be passed back to the
24. The bank can recover in the bad faith situation because there is a breach of the §
3-417(1)(b) warranty that he has no knowledge of the forgery. The bank can also recover from the
forger because the unauthorized signature operates as that person's signature in favor of one who
pays the check in good faith. U.C.C. § 3-404(1).
25. There is no specific provision in the Code barring drawers' suits in forged check cases, but
there have been no cases allowing such an action. See Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, SS3 F.2d
398, 417 (Sth Cir. 1977). Allowing drawer suits in forged check cases would undermine the Code's
finality policy. If the drawer could sue when the drawee bank is barred from recovery of its
payment, this would allow a customer to shift a forged check loss away from its bank to prior
transferors. Id.
26. Fair Park Nat'l Bank v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 541 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. Ct. App.
1976); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 85-86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973);
Penney, A Summary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in New York, 48 Cornell L.Q. 47, 68
(1962); Note, Warranties on Presentment, 44 B.U.L. Rev. 553, 561 (1964).
27. See notes 3, 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
28. This discrepancy in allocation of losses based on the type of forgery involved has been
questioned. It has been suggested that the desire to bring finality to transactions quickly should
apply to both types of check losses since the needs are the same in both situations. Perini Corp. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 1977); Allocation of Losses, supra note 8, at 459-61.
29. U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1)(a), 4-207(I)(a). The § 3-417 and § 4-207 warranties are virtually
identical, the former being given by anyone, the latter being given only by bank customers and
collecting banks. The warranty runs not only to immediate transferees but to any subsequent
holder who takes the instrument in good faith. Id. §§ 3-417(l), 4-207(l).
30. See note 4 supra. Generally, " 'good title' will mean no more than: 'this check bears no
forged indorsements.' " J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 15-5, at 510 (1972) (footnote omitted). See also U.C.C. § 3-417, Comment 3.
31. The drawee bank may proceed against prior transferors on the basis of the § 4-207(1)
warranties, while collecting banks may sue prior parties in the collection chain under § 4-207(2).
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party who took from the forger or, if available (and solvent), the forger
himself. Also, in a forged indorsement case, it has been held that the drawer
may skip over its drawee bank and directly sue a collecting or depositary
bank. 32
Whenever a check is paid with a forged indorsement, there is the danger
that the real payee, to whom the drawer might actually owe an obligation,
might appear and demand the payment that is due him. The drawer, perhaps
unaware of his right to have his drawee bank recredit the first check, may
refuse to issue a second check. The Code has therefore given the payee an
alternative course of action: he can sue the drawee bank for conversion.
Under the Code, paying a check with a forged indorsement constitutes
conversion, 33 and the payee, the beneficial owner of the check, 34 may sue the
bank directly for recovery of the money due him.3" The statutory scheme has
been established to protect the drawer, to avoid multiplicity of suits, and to
provide the true payee with a method of recovering the money he is owed.
Perini, the ostensible drawer in the instant case, 36 sued both the drawee and
collecting banks for conversion. It is questionable whether the drawer is a
proper plaintiff in a conversion action because the drawer is not the true
32. International Indus., Inc. v. Island State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Tex. 1971);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 315 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Allied
Concord Financial Corp. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4-7,
80 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624-26 (1969) (allowing drawer to sue collecting or depositary bank avoids
multiplicity of suits, but all defenses of the drawee bank are available under U.C.C. § 4-406(5)).
This view is not a unanimous one, however. The Code has no express provision authorizing a
direct suit by the drawer, Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345
Mass. 1, 6, 184 N.E.2d 358, 361 (1962), and it has been held that a drawer has no direct action
against a depositary or collecting bank and is limited to an action against the drawee bank to get
his account recredited. Id. There had been a similar split in authority under pre-Code law. See
Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 637 (1965).
Limiting the drawer's actions requires a series of suits to finally place the loss, the drawer first
suing its drawee to have its account recredited, and the drawee then proceeding against the
collecting bank for a breach of warranty of title. For a general discussion of the policy
considerations allowing a drawer to sue collecting banks directly, see Comment, Drawer v.
Collecting Bank for Payment of Checks on Forged Indorsements-Direct Suit Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 45 Temple L.Q. 102 (1971). Besides avoiding multiple actions, a drawer may
want to sue a collecting bank directly because of the drawee's possible insolvency, or to avoid
damaging its relationship with its drawee bank. Id. at 107-08.
33. U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c) & Comment 3.
34. Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1977); Jett v. Lewis State
Bank, 277 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); ree U.C.C. § 3-419, Comment 2.
35. See, e.g., Gast v. American Cas. Co., 99 N.J. Super. 538, 240 A.2d 682 (1968); Lee v.
Skidmore, 49 Ohio App. 2d 347, 361 N.E.2d 499 (1976); J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of
the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 15-4, at 500 (1972). In such a case, a bank will
normally be able to charge its drawer's account on the theory that it is subrogated to the rights of
the party whose indorsement was forged. See U.C.C. § 4-407.
36. Perini was, of course, not the actual drawer of the checks, but because it was precluded
from asserting the forged drawer's signature on account of its corporate resolution, the situa-
tion was as if Perini had actually drawn the checks.
owner of the check. 37 It has been held that a drawer cannot sue a collecting
bank for conversion and that his action is limited to one against his drawee
bank to have his account recredited. 38 The Perini court noted this, 39 but
never resolved the question because it ultimately concluded that there was no
forged indorsement liability at all and thus no conversion.
40
An exception to these general rules for the particular types of forgery exists
when one's negligence substantially contributes to the forgery. 4 1 In such a
case, the negligent party is precluded from denying the validity of the
signature. 42 If a bank has acted with reasonable care and is not guilty of any
negligence of its own,4 3 a drawer's negligence will operate to prevent the
bank's liability. The drawer will then suffer the loss caused by the forgery.4
These general rules formed the basis of Perini's claims. It was precluded
from asserting any forged check claims because its corporate resolution barred
its actions against its drawee banks,45 and the finality policy of the Code
barred an action against the depositary and collecting banks once the drawee
banks had made final payment on the checks.4 6 Thus, its success against the
banks depended on theories of liability arising from the forged indorsements.
This, in turn, depended on whether the indorsements by the wrongdoer,
which were not executed in the name of the named payees, were considered
forgeries, and whether the forged indorsements on forged checks would be
considered at all.
37. See Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Bank of America Nat Trust & Say. Ass'n, 275
Cal. App. 2d 1, 7-8, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622, 626 (1969); U.C.C. § 3-419, Comment 2. See also cases
cited note 34 supra.
38. Jett v. Lewis State Bank, 277 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1973); Stone & Webster Eng'r
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 4, 184 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1962) ("Not being a
holder or an agent for a holder, [the drawer] could not have presented the check to the drawee for
payment."). See also Comment, Drawer v. Collecting Bank for Payment of Checks on Forged
Indorsements-Direct Suit Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Temple L.Q. 102, 104 n. 18
(1971). But see Tubin v. Rabin, 533 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1976) (court affirmed conversion action
brought by the remitter of a cashier's check against a collecting bank).
39. 553 F.2d at 408 n.12.
40. Id. at 412-16; see notes 94-103 infra and accompanying text.
41. The negligence must actually contribute to the making of the forgery. U.C.C. § 3406,
Comment 4. A party may also be precluded from recovery if he ratifies the forgery, id. § 3-40-4(1,
or if he is otherwise precluded from denying the validity of the signature, id. See generally cases
cited note 10 supra.
42. U.C.C. § 3-406.
43. Id., Comment 6. A customer's negligence relieves the bank of liability only if the bank is
not negligent also. First Nat'! Bank v. Sogaard & Debo, Inc., 406 F.2d 1128, 1133-34 (5th Cir.
1969); Hardex-Steubenville Corp. v. Western Pa. Nat'l Bank, 446 Pa. 446, 455, 285 A.2d 874, 879
(1971). Although a bank can modify its forgery liability by contract, it cannot enforce an
agreement under which it could act in violation of reasonable commercial standards. U.C.C. §
4-103.
44. The bank has the duty of proving that the loss is due to the customer's negligence and not
the result of the bank's failure to use due care. U.C.C. § 4-406, Comment 4; see, e.g., Jackson v.
First Nat'l Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 551, 403 S.W.2d 109, 112 (1966).
45. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
46. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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The so-called "double forgery" cases, where both the drawer's and payee's
signatures are forged, generally occur when a forger signs a drawer's signa-
ture, makes out the check to a fictitious person or company, or to an existing
person or company that he does not intend actually to receive the funds,
indorses the payee's name, and then cashes the check himself.47 The problem
generally arises when the drawee bank attempts to shift its forged check loss
to a prior party in the collection chain based on a theory of forged indorse-
ment liability. 48 Prior to the Code, some courts held collecting and depositary
banks liable under theories of forged indorsement liability for breach of
guaranty of prior indorsements or implied warranty of title. 49 The majority
view, however, was that liability was to be treated according to the rules
governing forged checks, thus leaving the loss with the drawee bank. 5 Some
of the decisions utilized somewhat questionable constructions of negotiable
instruments law,51 but the underlying ideas, that the forged indorsement was
not the proximate cause of the loss, was summarized by the Supreme Court:
The drawee failed to detect the forged signature of the drawer. The forged indorse-
ment puts-him in no worse position than he would occupy if that were genuine. He
cannot be called upon to pay again and the collecting bank has not received the
proceeds of an instrument to which another held a better title. The equities of the
drawee who has paid are not superior to those of the innocent collecting bank who had
full right to act upon the assumption that the former knew the drawer's signature or at
least took the risk of a mistake concerning it.s2
The effect of the Code on double forgery cases is not spelled out with
47. The term "double forgery" is actually a misnomer. As one commentator noted In
considering double forgery cases under pre-Code law, all of the cases actually involved checks
payable to either fictitious payees or people not intended to have any interest in the checks, and
the checks in such circumstances were payable to bearer, requiring no indorsement at all. See
Double Forgeries, supra note 6, at 41. See also Whaley, supra note 4, at 282, where the
author's hypothetical illustrating a double forgery case is a check drawn by a forger to a fictitious
payee. Of course, it would be highly unlikely that the forger would make the check payable to
himself and then indorse his own name.
Theoretically, a forger could make out a check to a payee whom he intends to receive the
proceeds of the check, and the check is then stolen by someone who forges the indorsement and
cashes the check. Although possible, there are no reported cases with such an occurrence and its
likelihood seems minimal. See Double Forgeries, supra note 6, at 43.
48. See Double Forgeries, supra note 6, at 36-37. The situation also occurs, as in Perini,
where the drawer of a check, precluded from recovering the amount of the check from its drawee
bank, goes against a prior party in the collection chain because of the forged indorsement. Id. at
37.
49. See Check Frauds, supra note 2, at 245 nn.349 & 350 and accompanying text.
50. See id. at 245; Allocation of Losses, supra note 8, at 455.
5 1. See Check Frauds, supra note 2, at 245-46. It was held that forged indorsement principles
applied only when the drawee was not negligent in failing to detect the forged drawer's signature,
that these principles applied only in cases involving genuine instruments, and that a drawee bank
could not recover for a guarantee of prior indorsements because the guarantee did not extend to
drawee banks. Id.
52. United States v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 252 U.S. 485, 496 (1920).
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clarity.53 Some early commentators have suggested that the statutory war-
ranty of title reverses the pre-Code majority rule.S4 They reasoned that
because the forged check finality of payment rule is subordinated to the rules
regarding warranties of title,s" a transferor of a forged check with a forged
indorsement would breach the warranty of "good title to the instrument"
S6
and would not be able to avail himself of the Code finality policy. This view
ignores, however, the fact that, under the Code, in the case of a check made
payable to a person intended to have no interest in it, "[a]n indorsement by
any person in the name of a named payee is effective . .. .,"s and thus there
would be no breach of the statutory warranty of title.58
As stated above, an indorsement by one other than the named payee is
generally inoperative to pass title to the check. s9 A key exception to this is the
"fictitious payee" rule embodied in section 3-405(1)(b), which provides that
"(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective
if. . . (b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the
payee to have .no interest in the instrument.160 This section is particularly
designed to cover a case where a drawer or his disloyal employee authorized
to draw checks 6 1 makes out a check to a fictitious person or to someone whom
he intends to have no interest in the check. 62 The test is the drawer's intent,
and the actual existence of the payee is immaterial. 63 In such a case, anyone's
53. In concluding that the Code continued to place the risk on the drawee bank, one
commentator has noted that "[a]lthough this reasoning is based on some rather improbable
fictions, it is the only way that the UCC can be read to reach the common-law position on double
forgeries, a position that is clearly desirable since it places the risk... on the proper party-the
drawee." Whaley, supra note 4, at 282.
54. See, e.g., Note, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal Under Articles Three and Four of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 198, 211 (1962); Allocation of Losses, supra note
8, at 455.
55. U.C.C. § 3-418.
56. Id. §§ 3-417(1)(a), 4-207(1)(a).
57. Id. § 3-405(1).
58. See Double Forgeries, supra note 6, at 42-44; Whaley, supra note 4, at 282.
59. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
60. U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(b).
61. U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(c) covers the situation where the employee does not sign the checks, but
merely supplies the drawer with the name of a payee whom the employee intends to have no
interest in the check. The Code resolves the previous split in authority as to whether the
employee's intent in this situation will be imputed to the drawer. Under the Code, it will be, and
in such a case, any indorsement is effective to pass title. See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 451 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1971). See generally Comment, The
Resolution of Padded Payroll Cases by the Uniform Commercial Code: A Pandora's Box, 9 B.C.
Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 379, 381-82 (1968).
62. U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 3. "[A]n instrument is drawn to the order of a fictitious payee
if it is not intended that the person named on its face have any interest in it." Security-First Nat'l
Bank v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 154, 157, 137 P.2d 452, 453-54
(1943).
63. See U.C.C. § 3-405, Comments 1, 3.
1282 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
indorsement in the payee's name will be effective to pass title to the checks
and there will be no breach of warranties.
64
Section 3-405 is silent as to whether its provisions are applicable to the case
where a forger applies the drawer's signature. According to the Perini court,
however, section 3-405(1)(b) is not limited to cases where the drawer is
authorized to draw checks and covers any drawer, whether authorized or
not.65 Even if drawn by a forger, his intent that the payee have no interest in
the check will bring the indorsement within the section, and an indorsement
in the payee's name will not be considered forged. 66 Consequently, despite the
double forgery, the check falls within the "fictitious payee" rule of section
3-405(1)(b), and title to the check may be passed. Thus, with a check made
out to a fictitious payee, where one is authorized to draw checks, there will be
no check fraud at all, and if the drawer is a forger, liability will be determined
according to the rules covering forged checks.
Prior to the adoption of the Code, the Negotiable Instruments Law treated
a check made out to a fictitious payee as payable to the bearer. 67 It was
transferable by delivery and an indorsement was unnecessary. Even a forged
indorsement did not give rise to a cause of action because the indorsement
was considered superfluous and was disregarded. 68 The Code specifically
rejects this bearer paper approach 69 and requires an indorsement,70 although
64. Kansas Bankers Sur. Co. v. Bank of Oddessa, 386 F. Supp. 555, 559 (W.D. Mo. 1974);
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 519
S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. 1975); First Pa. Banking & Trust Co. v. Montgomery County Bank &
Trust Co., 29 Pa. D. & C. 2d 596, 600 (Montgomery County Ct. 1962); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v.
Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
65. 553 F.2d at 409 n.14.
66. "The person who forged the check may not have been a 'drawer' for all purposes, but he
signed 'as or on behalf of' the drawer, within § 3.405. Obviously he 'intended the payee to have
no interest' in the check because the payee was fictitious. Since, under this section, anyone is
authorized to endorse on behalf of a person not intended to have any interest in the instrument,
the endorsement in the name of [the fictitious payee] was effective to pass title .... " Aetna Life
& Cas. Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). See also Whaley,
Forgery and the Holder in Due Course: The Commercial Paper Puzzle, 78 Com. L.J. 277, 282
(1973). Under pre-Code law, the forger's intent was similarly controlled as to whether the
"fictitious payee" rule applied because he was the person making the check so payable. See W.
Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes § 14% at 432 (2d ed. 1961); Check Frauds,
supra note 2, at 246-47.
67. See W. Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes § 149 (2d ed. 1961).
68. See, e.g., Louisville Credit Men's Ass'n v. Louisville Trust Co., 422 S.W.2d 421, 422
(Ky. 1968); Prugh, Combest & Land, Inc. v. Linwood State Bank, 241 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1951); Aritor Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 672, 674, 254 N.Y.S.2d 899,
901 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 193, 268 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1966).
69. See U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 1. See also Wright v. Bank of California, Nat'l Ass'n, 276
Cal. App. 2d 485, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1969) (court refused to accept as effective any "equivalents"
for an indorsement).
70. U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 1. See also Delmar Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 300 F.
Supp. 496 (E.D. Mo. 1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1970), where a series of checks were
cashed with forged indorsements, some drawn while the Negotiable Instruments Law was still in
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virtually any indorsement will be effective, 7' so that the,:e will be at least the
appearance of a regular chain of indorsements. 72 The indorsement, however,
must be made in the name of the fictitious payee for the protections of section
3-405 to apply. If the indorsement is not in the name of the named payee, it is
ineffective to pass title and the protections of section 3-405 are not available."
3
Some commentators have stated that section 3-405 ends any question of
forged indorsement liability in double forgery cases.74 "In effect then, what
the collecting bank has in such a case is title to a forged check, but title
nonetheless." '75 If this interpretation of section 3-405 is correct, then the Code
does indeed resolve the double forgery issue in the usual case where the forger
has been careful enough to indorse the check in the name of the payee.
Because even a forger's intent that the payee have no interest in the check is
sufficient to bring the indorsement within section 3-405,76 the indorsement is
thus effective to pass title77 and there will be no warranty liability as some
earlier commentators had suggested. 78 However, the protections of section
3-405 apply only where the indorsement was made in the name of the payee.7
9
When the indorsement is defective, as in Perini, where the indorser signed as
an individual and not as a representative of the named companies,80 then the
protections of section 3-405 are not available. Thus, problems in the double
forgery cases remain.
Few cases decided under the Code have faced the double forgery issue. In
Mortimer Agency v. Underwriters Trust Co., 8 1 the court followed the pre-
Code majority rule, reasoning that the Code's finality principle left the loss
with the drawee bank.82 In Bank of Thomas County v. Dekle,83 a drawer sued
its drawee bank to recover payments made on checks with both forged
indorsements and forged drawer's signatures. The bank had moved for
effect, and the rest after the Code had become effective. The Court held the former to be bearer
paper, and the latter to be order instruments requiring indorsements. 300 F. Supp. at 498.
71. U.C.C. § 3-405(1) provides: "An indorsement by any person in the name of a named
payee is effective . . . ." (emphasis added). See id., Comment 1.
72. Id., Comment 1.
73. Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 415 (5th Cir. 1977); Travco Corp. v.
Citizen Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 42 Mich. App. 291, 293, 201 N.W.2d 675, 676 (1972);
Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
74. See Double Forgeries, supra note 6, at 42-44; Whaley, supra note 4, at 282 (1973). Even
those commentators who thought that the Code had shifted the losses for double forgeries away
from drawee banks regarded such a shift as an undesirable departure from the Price v. Neal
finality principle. See Allocation of Losses, supra note 8, at 460.
75. Double Forgeries, supra note 6, at 43 (footnote omitted).
76. See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
80. 553 F.2d at 401; see note 13 supra and accompanying text.
81. 73 Misc. 2d 970, 341 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
82. Id. at 973-74, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
83. 119 Ga. App. 753, 168 S.E.2d 834 (1969).
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summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred under Georgia
law by a sixty-day statute of limitations, within which a customer was
required to report a forged check to its bank.8 4 The court refused to grant
summary judgment, and permitted the action to proceed under the longer
statute of limitations for reporting a forged indorsement.8 5 Unfortunately, the
court never reached the merits, but it can be argued that this case, by
following the forged indorsement rather than the forged check statute, indi-
cated a different position in the rules regarding double forgeries. The Perini
court, however, rejected such a contention,8 6 stating that the case was limited
only to questions of timeliness of suit and the drawer-drawee relationship.8
7
A case relied upon by the Perini court was Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v.
Hampton State Bank,88 a case that "suggests that the title warranty does not
mandate shifting the loss to collecting banks in a double forgery case." 8 9 In
Aetna, someone had stolen a company check, credibly forged the drawer's
signature, and made it payable to a fictitious company. A depositary bank
credited the account that had been opened in the name of the fictitious
company, 90 and the issue was whether the indorsement in the name of that
company rendered the depositary bank liable for breach of warranty of title. 9 1
The court held that the forged indorsement did not deprive the bank of title
because the indorsement was effective to pass title under section 3-405.92 The
court then stated, in a passage quoted by the Perini court, that there was no
liability for breach of warranty.
It may seem odd to speak of a warranty of title to a forged check, but that is exactly
what we have here .... A warranty of title is nothing more than an assurance that no
one has better title to the check than the warrantor, and therefore, that no one is in a
position to claim title as against the warrantee, as the payee or other owner of a
genuine check could do if his endorsement were forged. ... [The drawee bank's] loss
could not be said to have resulted from any breach of [the depositary bank's] warranty
of title because no person whose name appeared to be endorsed on the check has
asserted any claim of title based on lack of a genuine endorsement. [The drawee's] loss
84. U.C.C. § 4-406(4) gives a customer one year to report a forged check and three years to
report a forged indorsement. If the customer fails to report the forgeries within this period, he is
precluded from asserting the forgery even if he is not at fault. The Georgia version of the Code,
under which this case was decided, allowed the customer only sixty days to report a forged check,
and one year to report a forged indorsement. See Ga. Code Ann. § 109A-4-406(4) (1973).
85. Bank of Thomas County v. Dekle, 119 Ga. App. 753, 757, 168 S.E.2d 834, 837 (1969).
86. 553 F.2d at 416 n.29.
87. Id.
88. 497 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
89. Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 415 (5th Cir. 1977).
90. In this case, the forger had the good sense to indorse the check in the exact name of the
payee. 497 S.W.2d at 83.
91. Id. This was an odd case, because here the bank was asserting its own negligence so that
it would be liable to the drawee bank, and thus able to recover from its insurer. The court
rejected this contention, holding that the finality policy of the Code precluded transactions from
being overturned by negligence actions unless the negligence amounted to a lack of good faith.
Id. at 85-86; see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
92. 497 S.W.2d at 84.
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was rather the result of paying out its money on a check to which its own depositor's
name was forged.93
The Perini court began its analysis with section 3-405. If the checks had been
properly indorsed in the name of the companies, title to the checks would
have passed.94 While the court noted that the defective indorsements removed
the case from the coverage of section 3-405,95 it did not conclude that the
banks had breached their warranty of title. Following the Aetna definition of
warranty of title, 96 the court reasoned that in the case of a defective
indorsement on a forged check, a bank's liability in accepting for deposit or
paying that check is limited to the claims of the true payee. 97 A bank that
pays a check with a defective indorsement generally is not accountable for
every loss that might not have occurred if the bank had returned the check for
a proper indorsement when the funds reach the intended payee. 98 As in
Perini, where the named companies received the payment, 99 any loss that
occurs would not be caused by the payment of a check with a defective
indorsement but rather by the fact that a forged check was paid at all. There
was no danger here, the court noted, of a true payee appearing with a
superior claim to the checks because even if the companies were not fictitious,
they were not intended to have any interest in the checks and there was no
obligation owed them. 00 The court did not go so far as to say that anyone
dealing with a defective indorsement risks only that he is dealing with
someone other than the check's true owner, but it did limit that liability where
the faulty indorsement is on a forged check. 10 ' To support its holding, the
court relied upon the pre-Code majority rule regarding double forgeries,' 02
which treated the defective indorsement on a check with a forged drawer's
signature as a simple forged check case.10 3
Section 3-405 presumably solved the normal double forgery case, where the
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. 553 F.2d at 409.
95. Id. at 415.
96. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
97. 553 F.2d at 414-16.
98. Id. at 412. See also Blackmon v. Hale, 1 Cal. 3d 548, 555, 463 P.2d 418, 421, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 197 (1970) (incompleteness and irregularity of the payee's name inconsequential
because check reached its intended destination); First Nat'l Bank v. Barrett, 141 Ga. App. 161,
162, 233 S.E.2d 24, 25 (1977) (check without indorsements became properly payable when
delivered to payee); Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 242, 548 P.2d
563, 567 (1976) ("Actual receipt of the proceeds of the check may, therefore, preclude denial of the
endorsements authenticity and assertion of the forgery. If denial of the signature is precluded,
then the signature is operative and a collecting bank would not be required to bear any loss from
taking a check with a forged endorsement.').
99. "As fax as this litigation is concerned, the proceeds of the checks went to the payees
designated on the face of the instruments." 553 F.2d at 412.
100. Id. at 409, 412-13.
101. Id. at 414.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 415.
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indorsement matches the name of the payee.°10 " The Perini opinion suggests
that while section 3-405 is available in this situation, it is unnecessary because
a double forgery case should be treated as simply a forged check case. The
court therefore held that although section 3-405 did not apply in this situation
because the "forged" indorsement did not match the name of the payee, there
was still no breach of the statutory warranty since the intended payee received
payment. If there was no defect in title, then the indorsement required by
section 3-405 need not be in the payee's name, which suggests that any
indorsement would be adequate provided the intended payee received pay-
ment. Thus, although section 3-405 does not apply, the result is the same.
This makes the indorsements virtually superfluous, which was the view of the
pre-Code fictitious payee cases where such checks were treated as bearer
paper. 105
As noted, this concept was specifically rejected by the Code. 10 6 Making
these indorsements effective contravenes the stated purpose of section 3-405 in
requiring an indorsement at all: to maintain the appearance of a regular chain
of indorsements. 10 7 In an effort to follow the pre-Code majority rule, the
Perini court has rendered section 3-405 virtually meaningless. The court has
(a) expanded section 3-405 to cover the situation where an unauthorized
person applies the drawer's signature, (b) contracted the section by requiring a
match of the indorsement and the payee's name, and then (c) eliminated the
need of section 3-405 in a double forgery situation in favor of the pre-Code
majority rule. Even though the court stated that the case was not within the
provisions of section 3-405 as a result of the incomplete indorsements, the
consequence of the court's analysis is to effectively stretch the section far
beyond its express terms in order to reach the court's desired result.
Section 3-405 makes effective an indorsement in the name of the fictitious
payee. A bank should not be able to avail itself of this rule when it has paid a
check made out to person A indorsed in the name of person B. A check
payable to the "Southern Contracting Co." indorsed solely in the name of
"Jesse D. Quisenberry" should certainly put a bank on notice of some possible
irregularity. Thaf a bank may process many checks in a day should not justify
failure to check the indorsements on the checks it receives, and the fact that a
proper indorsement could have been easily obtained in this particular case
should not mean that a bank need not require that indorsement. In deciding
to leave double forgery losses in the forged check category as a matter of
policy, the Perini court has unnecessarily stretched section 3-405 far beyond
what would appear to be its proper limits.
Frederic L. Neustadt
104. See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
107. U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 1.
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Defamation-Corporation Held a "Person" Subject to the Gertz Test for
Determining Liability in Defamation Actions.-Recently, Reliance Insur-
ance Co. (Insurance) brought suit in the United States District Court, South-
ern District of New York, against Barron's Financial Weekly (Barron's), I a
business-oriented publication, charging that the magazine had defamed it in a
critical article. 2
The action arose from the publication of a Barron's article concerning
Insurance's proposed public offering of $50 million of series A preferred stock.
The basic theme of the article was that the true purpose of the offering was
being falsely stated since the offering was, in reality, a vehicle to benefit
Insurance's controlling stockholders, Reliance Financial Services Corp. and
that company's parent corporation, Reliance Group, Inc., rather than Insur-
ance itself.
The article, which contained numerous false and misleading statements,
was found "clearly defamatory of plaintiff."'3 In considering defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment, the principal question facing the court was
whether Barron's was in any way privileged in publishing this defamatory
material. More specifically, the issue was whether the private person versus
public figure standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,4 was also applicable to corporate plaintiffs. Judge Brieant,
granting Barton's motion for summary judgment, decided it was. s Reliance
Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court of appeals has addressed
the question of whether a corporation defamed by a mass media defendant is
a "person" for first amendment purposes. 6 There has, however, been much
discussion about the standard of care the mass media must exhibit in its
statements about natural persons. Since the landmark New York Times Co. v.
1. Barron's is a weekly magazine which focuses on business trends, finances, the stock
market, etc. Each week the magazine analyzes various companies and critiques them so as to
provide its readership with some insight for their investments.
Also named as defendants in the action were the magazine's corporate parent. Dow Jones &
Co., Inc., and Dr. Abraham J. Briloff, the author of the allegedly defamatory article.
2. The article was entitled "Whose 'Deep Pocket'?: At Reliance Group the Slogan Is 'Dig We
Must,' " and was authored by Dr. Abraham Briloff. Dr. Briloff held the Emanuel Saxe Chair of
Distinguished Professor of Accountancy at Baruch College of the City University of New York
He had published widely in the field of accounting, authoring many articles on "financial and
accounting matters directed to nontechnical readers, including members of the investing public,"
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 19771. Prior to this particular
article, Dr. Briloff had written several other articles criticizing the financial practices of other
companies.
3. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. at 1345. The court also believed the articles to
be defamatory of Reliance Group, Inc., as well as the prestigious "Big Eight" accounting firm of
Touche Ross & Co. Id.
4. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
5. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. at 1352.
6. See Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D Cal.
1977); Kohn, Corporation Loses Libel Suit; Public Figure Status Applied, 178 N.Y.L.J., Sept.
19, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
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Sullivan7 decision, this discussion has focused primarily upon the posture the
defendant maintains vis-i.-vis the public.8
In Sullivan, a Montgomery, Alabama, police commissioner had prevailed in
an Alabama state court action against The New York Times. The action was
based upon allegedly libelous statements contained in a paid advertisement
which charged that the local police had undertaken certain activities in
violation of the civil rights of Negroes during racial disturbances. 9 There were
two factual errors in the text of the advertisement which "were by any test
trivial.' 0 The paper was nevertheless held liable, since Alabama law did not
excuse good faith mistakes by the media, and since the privilege of fair
comment protected only those comments which were based upon true under-
lying facts.II The jury awarded Commissioner Sullivan $500,000 for injury to
his reputation despite the fact that he was neither named nor even directly
referred to in the advertisement. The jury found that the publisher had failed
to sustain his burden of proving the truth of the statements and the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed.' 2
Given the inequitable nature of the award, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court unanimously reversed.' 3 The Court found that the defense of
truth, by itself, was insufficient to protect the freedom of expression vital to
the functioning of a free society.14 Justice Brennan, author of the opinion-
described as "unquestionably the greatest victory won by .. .defendants in
the modern history of the law of torts," 15-stated:
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a more detailed discussion of the case and its impact on the law of
defamation, see Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-it New Constitutional Privilege, 5 1 Va.
L. Rev. 1 (1965); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1349 (1975); Hill,
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205 (1976); Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 191; Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised
Translation, 49 Cornell L.Q. 581 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. Rev. 315 (1965); Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 Tex. L. Rev. 199 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
9. 376 U.S. at 256-63.
10. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1349, 1365 (1975). One asserted that Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., had been arrested seven times in Alabama when, in fact, he had been arrested
four times. The other had stated that the police had "ringed the Alabama State College Campus"
when, in reality, they had been deployed in large numbers nearby. See 376 U.S. at 257-59.
11. 376 U.S. at 267.
12. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So.2d 25 (1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254
(1974).
13. Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg concurred in the result but did not join in the
opinion as it was their belief that the mass media should enjoy absolute immunity from liability in
suits of this nature. See 376 U.S. at 293-305.
14. Id. at 278-79.
15. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 118, at 819 (4th ed. 1971).
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The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. 16
The Supreme Court thereby recognized that the media enjoyed a "constitu-
tional privilege,1 17 at least with regard to its statements about public officials.
Thus, under Sullivan, in order for a public official to prevail in a defamation
action he must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was egregious,,-
undertaken with actual malice-a far cry from the standard the Alabama
state court had applied to The New York Times.
In cases after Sullivan, the Court attempted to define more clearly the
degree of fault which must be demonstrated in order to pierce the shield the
media enjoys by virtue of its constitutional privilege.1 9 As a result of these
decisions, in order to prevail in a defamation action a public official has to
sustain the heavy burden of proving that the media defendant entertained
serious doubt as to the truth of his publication, but nonetheless recklessly
proceeded to publish it.20 This must be proved in the "convincing clarity
which the constitutional standard demands." 2'
There are two other rules which operate in favor of defendants who can claim the
constitutional privilege. First, an appellate court will review all the factual evidence
presented below and make its own determination of whether actual malice was
demonstrated with convincing clarity, and, indeed, whether the allegedly defamatory
statement is capable of a defamatory meaning at all. Second, summary judgment for
the defendant is required where the defendant's affidavits as to lack of knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of truth are uncontroverted by the plaintiff. 22
The overwhelming difficulties presented to the plaintiffs in proving actual
16. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
17. Eaton, supra note 10, at 1366. The privilege adheres to the media because the Court
found that the media is "entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood ...."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The privilege is therefore referred to as
the "media's privilege."
18. 376 U.S. at 279-80. justice Brennan stated that "actual malice" must be proved in these
circumstances and defined that to mean "knowledge that [the statement] was false or... reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
19. See Eaton, supra note 10, at 1371-75.
20. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). See also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S.
279 (1971). In St. Amant the Court concluded that "reckless conduct is not measured by whether
a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." 390 U.S. at 731.
21. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
22. Eaton, supra note 10, at 1374 (footnotes omitted). See also Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406
F.2d 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 2S Cal.
App. 3d 384, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1972).
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malice, together with these additional rules, have, as a practical matter,
precluded recovery in cases where the constitutional privilege applies. 23
As previously mentioned, this constitutional privilege originally applied
only to defamatory statements regarding the "official conduct" of a "public
official"2A-a limited privilege indeed. These restrictions were, however,
short lived, since the expansion of the definitions of "public official '2 5 and
"official conduct" significantly broadened the media's constitutional privi-
lege. 26 At least one scholar foresaw this development. Soon after the Sullivan
decision, Professor Kalven noted that the "invitation to follow a dialectic
progression from public official to government policy to public domain . . .
seems to me to be overwhelming. '27 Indeed, just three years after Sullivan,
the Supreme Court accepted that invitation in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts. 28
In Butts the athletic director of the University of Georgia was accused by
the Saturday Evening Post of fixing a game which his football team had
played. The trial court awarded Mr. Butts a substantial judgment, but on
certiorari the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the constitutional
privilege should apply to the mass media's statements about both public
officials and public figures, like Mr. Butts. 29 Although there was substantial
disagreement among the Justices as to the definition of a public figure and the
extent to which the constitutional privilege should apply, 30 when the dust
settled there was no doubt that the constitutional privilege had once more
been expanded. 3 1 After Butts, actual malice had to be proved in any defama-
tion action brought by a "public figure."
The growth of the media's constitutional privilege did not stop there. In
Time, Inc. v. Hill32 the Supreme Court extended the privilege to matters of
public interest even where the reputations of "private individuals" were
involved.3 3 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 34 however, the expansion of
23. There are numerous cases which underscore this. See, e.g., Comment, The Expanding
Constitutional Protection for the News Media from Liability for Defamation: Predictability and
the New Synthesis, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1547, 1565-66 n. 116 (1972) (cases cited); Annot., 20 A.L.R.
3d 988 (1968). For a collection of cases in which the plaintiff has been successful in hurdling this
barrier, see Eaton, supra note 10, at 1375 n.113.
24. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
25. Eaton, supra note 10, at 1376-77.
26. Id. at 1378-79.
27. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 221.
28. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
29. Id. at 135-36, 154-55.
30. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275. Professor Kalven discusses the various opinions under the heading,
"You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card."
31. Id. at 278.
32. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
33. Whether Hill has any remaining vitality is in doubt. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Colin,
420 U.S. 469, 498 n.2 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
34. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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the media's constitutional privilege reached its limit. In Rosenbloom a
magazine distributor, charged and later acquitted of distributing obscene
literature, had been called a "smut merchant" by a radio station. 35 In his
plurality opinion Justice Brennan wrote: "We honor the commitment to
robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment,
by extending [the] constitutional [privilege] to all discussion and communica-
tion involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether
the persons involved are famous or anonymous. '36
The focus of the opinion was on the public's right to unfettered access to
information rather than on the defamed individual's right to privacy. There
was much division among the remaining Justices37 and many courts "were
clearly . . . troubled by application of the constitutional privilege" reasoning
set forth in Justice Brennan's Rosenbloom opinion. 38
The Court again addressed the issue of the media's constitutional privilege
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 9 In Gertz, an attorney who represented the
parents of a victim of a police officer's assault was described as a "Communist
fronter" and a "Leninist" in an article that appeared in a John Birch Society
magazine. The article discussed the murder trial of the police officer, and
linked the trial to a nationwide Communist conspiracy which intended to
discredit local police forces so that they could be replaced by a national police
force, like the Soviet KGB, which could be used to support a communist
dictatorship. Even though the attorney was only involved in the civil action,
and was in no way connected with the criminal proceeding, he was described
as the architect of a "frame-up. '40 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
applied Justice Brennan's Rosenbloom test and decided that the article met
the "significant public interest" standard set forth therein.4 '
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the
Court rejected the Rosenbloom extension of the constitutional privilege and
reembraced the reasoning set forth in Sullivan and Butts.4 2 In effect, the
Court returned to the public figure versus private person standard when
determining whether or not the media's "actual malice" constitutional privi-
35. Id. at 33-34.
36. Id. at 43-44 (footnote omitted).
37. See Eaton, supra note 10, at 1395-98.
38. Id. at 1399.
39. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
40. Id. at 325-26.
41. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972). rcu/d, 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
42. See 418 U.S. at 340-52. The opinion has been widely discussed. See generally Brosnahan,
From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First
Amemdment, 26 Hastings L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton, supra note 10; Hill, Defamation and Privacy
Under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205 (1976); Robertson, Defamation and the
First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 Tex. L. Rev. 199 (1976);
Comment, Reply and Retraction in Actions Against the Press for Defamation: The Effect of
Tornillo and Gertz, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 223 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 41, 139 (1974).
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lege shield would be invoked. If a person is found to be a public figure, in
order to recover damages for defamation, he has the burden of clearly proving
actual malice against a media defendant.4 3 A private person, on the other
hand, need only satisfy the generally more favorable common law stan-
dards. 44
Two factors played important roles in the Court's decision. First, although
the point was not elaborated, "implicit in its rationale [was] the traditional
tort doctrine of 'assumption of risk.' ,,45 Simply stated, when one voluntarily
abandons the shelter of anonymity, he forsakes the defamation protection
which the common law had developed. 4 6 Second, the Court placed significant
emphasis on the fact that "[p]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and
hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than
[do] private individuals . . . . -47 The Court thereby recognized that the right
of an individual to his privacy must be balanced against the mass media's
freedom to publish.
The Court in Gertz did not define with any degree of specificity what
"public figure" actually meant. Lower courts were not, however, left without
guidelines, for the Court appeared to envision three categories of public
figures.48 The first category included those who have "general fame or notori-
ety in the community. '4 9 Individuals would achieve this status (a) because
they "occupy positions of . . . persuasive power and influence," s ° (b) because
of their "pervasive involvement in the affairs of society"'51 or (c) because of the
43. 418 U.s. at 342-43, 348-50.
44. Id. at 347-48 & n. 10. Joel D. Eaton, in a well-reasoned article, outlined the Court's hold-
ings as follows:
"(1) Public persons (public officials and public figures) may recover for defamation only upon
clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity
or with reckless disregard of the truth;
"(2) All persons defamed by the news media may recover presumed and punitive damages only
if they establish liability by clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth;
"(3) The states may no longer impose liability without fault, but they may define the level of
fault required for recovery by private persons defamed by the news media, at least where
substantial danger to reputation is apparent on the face of the statement;
"(4) The states' interest in protecting reputation extends no further than compensation for
actual injury; therefore, unless a private person defamed by the news media can show knowing-
or-reckless-falsity by clear and convincing proof, damages may not be presumed and actual
damages must be proved by competent evidence." Eaton, supra note 10, at 1409-10 (footnotes
omitted).
45. Id. at 1419 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of this doctrine, see W. Prosser, Hand-
book of the Law of Torts § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
46. Eaton, supra note 10, at 1419.
47. 418 U.S. at 344.
48. Id. at 342-52.
49. Id. at 351-52.
50. Id. at 345.
51. Id. at 352.
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"notoriety of their achievements. s"5 2 The second category involved those situa-
tions where an "individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a
limited range of issues."5
3
The Court's third category hinged upon a more nebulous conception of
"public." "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public
figure through no purposeful action of his own .... ,,S4 These figures include
only those who are thrust into the limelight by some peculiar connection to an
event or another public figure. The Court cautioned, however, that "the
instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."55
The Court actually seemed to disfavor the first category, apparently feeling
that those who have merely participated in community and professional
affairs should not be penalized by allowing the press unfettered comment
about their personal lives.5 6 Instead, the Court found that "[ilt is preferable to
reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to
the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular con-
troversy giving rise to the defamation.
5S7
By 1976, the lower courts were able to apply several general ground rules in
any defamation action brought by a natural person against a media defen-
dant. The court first had to decide whether the plaintiff fit into any of the
three public figure categories defined in Gertz. If the plaintiff did, he had the
burden of proving actual malice.
There was, however, still no pronouncement by any appellate court as to
whether a corporation could be considered a private person for defamation
purposes"8 and, if not, whether the corporation fit into any of the three Gertz
categories used to determine the standard of care to which a media defendant
was to be held. Thus, when the district court for the District of Columbia was
52. Id. at 342.
53. Id. at 351. See also Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1333 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
54. 418 U.S. at 345.
55. Id. The "rare situation" occurred in Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 687 (1977), a case
involving the children of convicted spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The children were
subjected to defamatory statements even though they had changed their names to avoid the
public eye. The court held that "[a]s children of famous parents, they achieved 'general fame or
notoriety in the community' " and that the actual malice standard should therefore apply. Id. at
34.
56. See 418 U.S. at 352.
57. Id. "The Court offered some limited guidance on how to evaluate the "nature and extent"
of an individual's involvement in a public controversy. It suggested that public figure dassifica.
tion might turn on several factors: whether the individual sought out and discussed the issue with
the press; whether he 'thrust himself into the vortex of [the] public issue'; and whether he
otherwise 'engage[d] the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.'" All of
these factors seem to be tied directly to the assumption of the risk rationale. Eaton, supra
note 10, at 1422 (footnotes omitted); see note 45 supra and accompanying text.
58. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Kohn, Corporation Loses Libel Suit; Public Figure Status Applied, 178 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1977,
at 1, col. 2.
1978] 1293
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
faced with the question in Martin Marietta Corp. v. The Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 5 9 it was working on a clean slate.
The court met the issue squarely and decided that the innate distinctions
between corporate and individual defamation plaintiffs compelled the applica-
tion of different methods of analyzing their respective right to relief. 60 Recog-
nizing that Gertz was concerned primarily with society's interest in having
both a "press free from the shackles of self-censorship" while "preserving the
reputations of private individuals,"6 1 the court concluded
that the values considered important enough to merit accommodation with interests
protected by the first amendment are associated solely with natural persons, and that
corporations, while legal persons for some purposes, possess none of the attributes
[which Gertz] sought to protect. Justice Powell's detailed explanation of the personal
values deserving deference from the first amendment leaves no doubt that corporations
must be excluded from the Gertz holding.62
Judge Flannery's emphasis was clearly on his belief that corporations cannot
have private lives. 63 He stated that since corporations possess no "private
lives to begin with [they] must similarly be denied full protection from
libel." 64 Unlike a natural person, as a paper entity a corporation could only be
damaged by "imputation about its financial soundness or business ethics" and
only recover lost profits for damages. 65 This, he noted, was a far cry from
"the essential dignity and worth of every human being" which the Supreme
Court sought to protect in Gertz.66
Judge Flannery believed there were similarities between corporations and
public figures as defined in Gertz, in that "neither have private lives." '67 He
reasoned, however, that it "would not be entirely just" to apply the actual
malice standard in every defamation action brought by every corporate
plaintiff, "since implicit in the public figure concept [was] the conclusion that
society is somehow interested in the plaintiff and his activities. 68
Judge Flannery decided that the newsworthiness standard set forth in
Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom would provide a more effective
means of analyzing the defamation cause of corporate plaintiffs than would
Gertz, for that standard would protect corporations where issues of legitimate
public concern were not being discussed. 69 Justice Flannery recognized that
Rosenbloom had been overruled in Gertz, but believed that the Supreme Court
59. 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
60. Id. at 954-56.
61. Id. at 955.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Golden Palace, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 386 F. Supp. 107, 109
(D.D.C. 1974)).
66. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).





rejected Rosenbloom "because it took into consideration only society's interest
in having a press free from the shackles of self-censorship while failing to
protect society's strong and legitimate interest in preserving the reputations of
private individuals.' 70 Though corporations have no private lives to protect,
Judge Flannery noted that the states nevertheless have a legitimate interest
in protecting the reputations of their corporations. 71 It was his belief that the
Rosenbloom newsworthiness standard would simultaneously protect both the
reputations of corporate plaintiffs and the public's right to unencumbered
access to the news.
7 2
Judge Flannery then applied the Rosenbloom standard to the facts before
him. The plaintiff corporation had brought suit against the Evening Star
newspaper for publication of defamatory articles tying the corporation to stag
parties at which members of the Defense Department had been entertained
for the express purpose of winning their favor. The articles, which charged
plaintiff with, inter alia, paying $3,000 to a prostitute for "entertainment,"
were published at a time when the issue of defense contractors' favors to
employees of the Defense Department was being investigated by both Con-
gress and the press.73 The court found the article of legitimate public interest
and consequently applied the actual malice standard.74 Plaintiff was unable to
overcome its burden of proof and the newspaper prevailed in its motion for
summary judgment. 75
Judge Flannery reasoned alternatively that, even if the Gertz standard were
applied to corporate plaintiffs, the Martin Marietta corporation would still be
subject to the actual malice standard. He felt that due to its size and position
in the industry Martin Marietta was in a position to "influence the resolution
of the issues involved," would always be a public figure for defamation
purposes, and would therefore have to hurdle the same barriers as did its
notorious human counterparts. 76
In Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press,77 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California was faced with the same
issue. The Trans World suit stemmed from erroneous reports published by
various media defendants involving a complaint issued against the plaintiff
which the Federal Trade Commission had intended to issue. The defamatory
articles were based upon a press release, distributed by the FTC, announcing
the Commission's intention to bring suit against the plaintiff and seven other
similar companies. 78
The FTC release listed four unfair and deceptive practices with which the
companies were charged, but clearly indicated that plaintiff and another
70. Id. at 955 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 956.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 950.
74. Id. at 956.
75. Id. at 961.
76. Id. at 956-57 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
77. 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
78. Id. at 917.
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company were being charged with only two of these four practices. 79 However,
both major domestic wire services, the Associated Press and United Press
International, prepared dispatches failing to note the limited nature of the
charges against plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff demanded that both wire
services and two California papers that had published stories based upon the
dispatches publish corrections. They all complied, but the Associated Press'
and one of the newspapers' corrections were untimely.80
The court noted that the only clear precedent for determining what first
amendment standard was applicable to media statements regarding corporate
plaintiffs was Judge Flannery's decision in Martin Marietta.8 The court,
however, rejected Martin Marietta outright. First, California state law did
not recognize any distinction between individual and corporate plaintiffs in
defamation cases8 2 and, second, the court believed that the Supreme Court
had overruled Rosenbloom "without qualification," thereby making any future
application of its reasoning improper.8 3 Furthermore, the court reasoned:
[T]he line between the interests of natural persons and corporations is frequently fuzzy
and ill-defined. Various legal considerations have long led to the incorporation of
businesses that are in economic reality but individual proprietorships or partnerships.
On the other hand, very large business enterprises may be conducted as individual
proprietorships or partnerships. For that additional reason, it seems that for purposes
of applying the First Amendment to defamation claims, the distinction between
corporations and individuals is one without a difference.8 4
The Trans World court instead relied upon the Gertz standard. Under Gertz,
the court's first task was to determine whether the corporation was a public
figure, that is, whether it (1) was a public figure for all purposes because of its
"pervasive fame or notoriety," (2) a public figure for limited purposes because
it had "voluntarily inject[ed] itself into a particular controversy, '"8 5 or (3)
whether it fell into that severely restricted class of persons who have been
"drawn into a particular public controversy. ' 8 6 Without setting forth its
reasons, the court found the first two categories inappropriate, finding instead
79. Id. Trans World and the seven other companies named in the suit were all in the debt
collection business. Four deceptive practices were alleged in the complaint: "(1) the use of
collection forms appearing to be urgent telegraphic messages, (2) the use of forms falsely stating
that legal action was about to be instituted, (3) the use of letters threatening debtors with
damage to their credit ratings unless bills were promptly paid, and (4) falsely holding themselves
out as bona fide collection agencies when in fact the companies were only mailing services
engaged in sending out form messages to debtors." Id. The FTC release indicated that the
plaintiff was not being charged with the third and fourth practices.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 819.
82. Id. The Trans World court recognized that the recent Supreme Court opinions had "been





86. Id. at 820.
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that the corporate plaintiff fell within the third "rare" category. 87 The court
held that plaintiff was an involuntary public figure because of the Federal
Trade Commission's peculiar public function. While the court recognized that
"mere involvement in litigation [or] the associated publicity [was not]
sufficient to turn litigants into public figures," 88 it emphasized the integral role
which publicity plays in the functioning of the Federal Trade Commission
and in the protection of the public-at-large. These special circumstances were
sufficient to convince Judge Schwarzer that plaintiff belonged in the third
Gertz category.
The proposed complaint was issued under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, . .. which charges the FTC with the responsibility of protecting the public
against unfair and deceptive trade practices.... When there is reason to believe that
violations of law may be occurring, the Commission will issue a proposed complaint
with a notice that the complaint will be filed and proceedings commenced unless the
proposed respondents agree to discontinue the challenged practices. . . .An integral
feature of the Commission's enforcement effort is the publicity which attends the
issuance of proposed complaints. By means of that publicity, the Commission not only
seeks to warn the consuming public against possible harmful practices but it seeks to
induce respondents to agree promptly to remedial orders without the necessity of
extended legal proceedings. 89
In other words, in view of the special public service FTC proposed com-
plaints provide, the court found that issuance of such a release draws the
named respondent into a particular controversy.
Trans World may not have been a "public figure" until the proposed complaint issued
but when it did it was clearly drawn into a particular controversy having its origin in
Trans World's own conduct and activities and thereby became a public figure for the
limited range of issues relating to the FTC's complaint. 90
As a public figure, Trans World had to bear the heavy burden of proving
actual malice. 9 1
The court found that plaintiff's charges of actual malice against the news-
papers themselves fell short of the mark. Trans World had alleged that it
called the newspapers in question and informed them of the errors in their
story, but that the newspapers printed the story anyway. The court held this
insufficient because, "[i]f potential plaintiffs in libel suits could cut off a
malice defense simply by calling a newspaper and giving a broad denial of an
article, the first amendment policy embodied in [Sullivan] would be under-
mined."9 2
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 821.
91. Plaintiff set forth four arguments in support of its actual malice contentions against the
wire services. The court found none of them persuasive in that none proved actual malice with
the "convincing clarity" required. Id. at 822.
92. Id. (quoting Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspapers. Corp., 417 F. Supp. 947,
960 (D.D.C. 1976)). The court did not, however, grant summary judgment to defendant news-
papers because factual questions concerning the interrelationship between the organizational
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In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's,93 Judge Brieant was faced with the
task of resolving the controversy apparent in the conflicting opinions of Trans
World and Martin Marietta. In determining whether the actual malice stan-
dard was to be used, he had to decide whether to apply the Rosenbloom test,
looking at the action from the basis of the public's interest in the event, or the
Gertz standard, examining the plaintiff's role in public affairs. After examin-
ing both opinions, 94 Judge Brieant decided to follow Trans World and apply
the Gertz standard to the corporate plaintiff. 95
Applying that reasoning, he found that plaintiff was a public figure under
the first two Gertz categories. 96 First, the court found the plaintiff to be a
public figure for purposes of all defamation actions it might bring, since (1) it
was a large corporation with over a billion dollars in assets, (2) nearly all its
stock was held by a publicly held corporation listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, and (3) the company was closely regulated by both the New York
and Pennsylvania Insurance Departments and by the SEC, thereby necessitat-
ing the periodic filings of public reports.
97
Additionally, the court found plaintiff to be a public figure for the limited
purposes of the article in question since it "was, at the time of the libel,
offering to sell its stock to the public, thereby voluntarily thrusting itself into
the public arena, at least as to all issues affecting that proposed stock sale." 98
Because it was "in registration" at the time of the libel, plaintiff claimed it
could not publicly comment about the defamatory article because of the
peculiarities of federal securities law. 99 Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933
and certain SEC guidelines promulgated thereunder prohibit offerors from,
inter alia, making offers to sell while the stock is in registration. °00 Plaintiffs
argued that in light of the SEC's expansive definition of an "offer to sell," it
was effectively precluded from making any response to the Briloff article. 101
The court, however, found this argument "no more than a make weight,"
since it believed the SEC's regulations were not intended to preclude an issuer
structures of the two papers remained, questions which cou)d have related to the issue of malice.
Id. at 822-23.
93. 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
94. Id. at 1346-47. Judge Brieant did not elaborate ipon his reasons for dismissing the
Martin Marietta rationale.
95. Id. at 1348. In the recent case of Lake Navasu Estates, Inc. v. Reader's Digest, No. 46427
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1977), Judge Motley also applied the Gertz standard to a corporate plaintiff. In
a quite confusing opinion, she summarily decided that plaintiff was not a public figure. In
deciding it was not, she applied state law. Even though subject to the stricter state law standards,
the media defendant prevailed. The plaintiff had based its claim on a criticial article written
about another real estate company with a similar name. It was the court's belief that the
publisher was under no duty to distinguish between the companies because the plaintiff had
consciously chosen to use such a similar name.
96. 442 F. Supp. at 1348-49.
97. Id. at 1348.
98. Id. (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 1348-49.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
101. 442 F. Supp. at 1348.
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from denying a defamatory article. 10 2 Indeed, stated the court, "[t]o the extent
the SEC purports to deny an issuer this fundamental right, that would appear
to be a usurpation of power, and a violation of the issuer's First Amendment
rights."' 0 3 In any event, it was the court's belief that a reply could be
formulated in such a way that it would not constitute an offer to sell.
The court similarly rejected plaintiff's argument that it was not a public
figure because it was not a "household word," since it was a "well recognized
name in the financial and business community. 1t1 4
Having found the plaintiff to be a "public figure," the court applied the
actual malice standard to the Barron's article.' 0 5 It held that the article did
not constitute "fraudulent, knowing, publication of a falsehood, or reckless
disregard of falsity" 0 6 because Dr. Briloff, the author, was an acknowledged
expert in the area and the magazine had a right to rely on his expertise. In
addition, there was no proof that the errors contained therein were included
with knowledge of their faisity. Simply, actual malice was not proved. 07
The question of the extent to which the media's constitutional privilege
should apply when a defamed corporate plaintiff pursues an action is by no
means a simple one to answer. The disagreement between Martin Marietta,
and Trans World and Reliance serves to highlight the difficulty. It is submit-
ted, however, that Judge Flannery's reasoning in Martin Marietta is the more
compelling and, therefore, that the Rosenbloom newsworthiness test should be
applied to all cases in which a corporate plaintiff pursues a defamation action.
The Founding Fathers held the public need to enjoy access to an unfettered
press so crucial that a guarantee thereof was included in the Bill of Rights. It
is true, however, that, while ample evidence can be found in the remainder of
the Constitution to buttress an argument in favor of limiting the media's
constitutional privilege with respect to individuals, 08 applying the same ar-
guments in favor of a corporation would be strained at best, because corpora-
tions are nothing more than paper entities existing solely by leave of state
legislatures. 109
As Judge Flannery demonstrated in Martin Marietta, it is an impossibility
for a corporation itself to have a private life. The corporation, through effort
and expense, can develop trade secrets and the like, but these are protected by
the laws of unfair competition and certainly do not need the additional
protection of a relaxed defamation standard. It can hardly be debated that the
thrust of the recent Supreme Court defamation opinions is toward a develop-
ment of the media's constitutional privilege that is compatible with the rights
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1348-49.
104. Id. at 1349.
105. Id. at 1349-50.
106. Id. at 1349.
107. Id. at 1352.
108. See, e.g., U. S. Const. amend. IV, IX, XIV.
109. H. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises § 12,
at 18-19 (2d ed. 1970).
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of natural persons to enjoy their private lives. 1 10 It is highly doubtful that the
interests of corporations, whose very existence depends upon the will of state
legislatures, are sufficient to pierce the media's shield of protection provided
by the Constitution itself. A corporation is by definition distinct from the
individuals who control it, and should not be able to enjoy rights comparable
to those enjoyed by individuals as no need is thereby fulfilled. This does not
mean, however, that corporations should be left at the mercy of the media,
for a corporation's very existence is clearly dependent-at least in part-upon
the public's perception of the integrity and honesty of its operations. Applying
the Rosenbloom standard to corporate plaintiffs does not leave corporations
unprotected since under Rosenbloom the actual malice standard is not auto-
matically applicable. Implicit in the reasoning of Rosenbloom is the concept
that the public has some interest in the corporate plaintiff and its activities.
Under Rosenbloom then, a small family business-Mom & Pop Cigar Store,
Inc.-need only worry if its business activities somehow create a public
interest. Theoretically this same corporation could be declared a public figure
under the Gertz standard as it solicits business from, and its doors are open to,
the general public. The Rosenbloom test would, therefore, provide the small
corporation with some measure of protection that might not be available
under Gertz.
The Rosenbloom test could also have a different impact than the Gertz test
when applied to corporations that have issued securities. As a practical matter
the effect on the large corporate plaintiff of applying Gertz or Martin Marietta
(Rosenbloom) will in most cases be identical-the media's constitutional privi-
lege will apply. Corporations that are, though publicly listed, of medium size
and relatively unknown to the populace at large could, however, present a
different situation. Under the Gertz reasoning any publicly listed corporation
would be fair game to the media, and would have to overcome the heavy
"actual malice" burden in any suit brought against the media for alleged
defamatory statements despite the fact that the corporation's activities are of
little interest to the general public. This point is illustrated by the Reliance
Court's emphasis upon the nature of the corporate plaintiff's securities and
the manner in which its securities were being offered."' Indeed, the same
result is possible where the very small corporate plaintiff, though not publicly
listed (closely held), has offered, without registration, a limited number of
securities to the public, a transaction specifically permitted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.' 12 The danger involved in application of the
Gertz standard to suits brought by corporate plaintiffs is that the courts will
tend to proceed almost mechanically. Rosenbloom, however, provides a more
flexible standard, and would at least require the court to investigate whether
the public does, indeed, have any legitimate interest in the allegedly defama-
tory material. A. William Urquhart
110. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); notes 61-66 supra and
accompanying text.
111. See notes 97, 98 supra and accompanying text.




Torts--Parole Board Members Have Only Qualified Immunity for De-
cision To Release Prisoner.-Mitchell Blazak was a parolee who had been
released from prison after serving one-third of a sentence for armed robbery
and assault with intent to kill. While still on parole Blazak shot and killed
John Grimm and permanently injured Robert Bennett during a robbery.
Grimm's parents, Bennett, and Bennett's wife brought suit against the
Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, as well as individual Board members,
claiming that the release of Blazak from prison had been grossly negligent. In
support of this contention, they cited Blazak's prior criminal record and
several psychiatric reports which stated that Blazak was a highly dangerous
paranoid schizophrenic who required confinement.' The trial court dismissed
the complaint, relying on parole board members' absolute immunity from suit
and the court of appeals affirmed. 2 The Supreme Court of Arizona, however,
reversed 3 and remanded, holding that public officers, including parole board
members, have only a qualified immunity in the exercise of their discretionary
functions. In addition, parole board members were found to have a duty to
individual members of the public to avoid the grossly negligent release of
highly dangerous prisoners. Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles,
115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977).
There has been a notable trend in recent years to focus greater attention on
the victims of crime. 4 This has been evidenced by the rapid adoption of
crime-victim compensation statutes,5 which typically provide funds for medi-
cal expenses and loss of income resulting from injury sustained by the inno-
cent victim of a crime, 6 and by programs promulgated by prosecutors' offices,
police departments, and private organizations to provide special services to
1. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 262, 564 P.2d 1227, 1229
(1977). Blazak's record went back to 1961 when he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for a
burglary. He was later sentenced for another burglary, then released on parole, but subsequently
returned to prison for parole violation. After release, he was arrested for marijuana possession.
Id.
2. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 26 Ariz. App. 591, 550 P.2d 637 (1976).
3. The court found that dismissal of the suit against the Board of Pardons and Paroles as an
entity was proper since appellants had not complied with statutory requirements for negligence
suits against the state. 115 Ariz. 260, 263, 564 P.2d 1227, 1230.
4. Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future?, 11 U. Rich. L. Rev. 447,
451 (1977); U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 8, 1975, at 42.
S. As of last year, some twenty states had enacted crime compensation programs. U.S. News
& World Rep., July 4, 1977, at 65; see, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code §§ 13959-13969 (West Supp. 1977);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258A, §§ 1-7 (MichielLaw. Co-op 1968); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§
18.351-368 (Supp. 1977-1978); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:4B-1 to -21 (West Supp. 1977-1978); N.Y.
Exec. Law §§ 620-635 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1972-1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2743.51-
.72 (Page Supp. 1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §§ 180-7 to -7.16 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 631 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977). A newly enacted statute in
New York provides that profits (from books, movies, etc.) received as a result of the commission
of a crime must be paid to the Crime Victims Compensation Board for the benefit of victims of
the crime. Id. at § 632-a.
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victims. 7 In addition, allowing offenders to make restitution to their victims is
gaining acceptance as an alternative to traditional sentencing. 8
The Grimm case represents another aspect of this trend-a more vigorous
approach that has been termed "victims rights litigation."9 Such litigation
includes actions against custodial agencies such as parole boards, prisons, and
mental institutions whose alleged negligence in releasing the offender enabled
him to commit further crimes.10 In the past, one major impediment to these
suits has been the absolute immunity parole boards enjoyed, both at common
law 1 and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute.' 2 It has
been assumed, however, that, absent absolute immunity, suits premised on a
negligence theory could be maintained against parole boards.13
The Grimm court rejected the absolute immunity impediment, thus opening
the way to negligence suits against parole boards, but adopted a standard of
care that may prove just as restrictive to recovery as the imposition of
absolute immunity. This Note will examine the reasons underlying absolute
immunity and the factors influencing its rejection by the court in Grimm. It
will also examine the "duty" requirement and evaluate the standard of care
adopted by the court-the avoidance of gross negligence in the release of
highly dangerous prisoners on parole.
7. Carrington, supra note 4, at 451-52; see, e.g., U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 8, 1975, at
43-44; Psychology Today, Mar. 1975, at 15-16.
8. S. Schafer, Compensation and Restitution to Victims of Crime 123 (2d ed. 1970); Psychol-
ogy Today, July 1977, at 22-23. It has also been pointed out that, while interest in restitution
arose from increased concern for crime victims, the programs really serve to aid the offender and
not the victim. Id. Some statutes provide that restitution may be made a condition of probation.
See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3 (1968); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1106 (Purdon Supp.
1977-1978); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.95.210 (1977).
9. Carrington, supra note 4, at 454-69. This type of litigation was one of the subjects of a
panel sponsored by the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section at its annual meeting
in August 1977. See 46 U.S.L.W. 2097-98 (Aug. 23, 1977).
10. Carrington, supra note 4, at 459-65. Of course, suits could also be brought against other
third parties such as landlords, hotels, and shopping centers for failure to provide adequate
security, as well as against the perpetrator of the crime. Id. at 456-59, 465-69.
11. Neal v. McCall, 134 Ga. App. 680, 681, 215 S.E.2d 537, 538 (1975); Seiss v. McConnell,
74 Mich. App. 613, 614, 255 N.W.2d 2, 2-3 (1977); Reiff v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct.
537, 539-40, 354 A.2d 918, 919 (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Although the statute is silent, some courts have found absolute
immunity under § 1983 in suits brought under this statute by victims of crime alleging negligent
release of the parolee who committed the crime, see, e.g., Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd mem., 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977); Reiff v.
Pennsylvania, 397 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1975), and in suits brought by prisoners themselves,
challenging denial of parole, see, e.g., Cruz v. Skelton, 502 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1974); Silver v.
Dickson, 403 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990 (1969); Garvey v. Casson, 423
F. Supp. 68 (D. Del. 1976); Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich.
1975); Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975);
Fitzgerald v. Procunier, 393 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Joyce v. Gilligan, 383 F. Supp. 1028
(N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd mem., 510 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1975).
13. Carrington, supra note 4, at 465.
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Originally, Anglo-American legal theory did not hold public officers im-
mune from liability;,14 rather, they were responsible for their tortious acts just
as were private citizens.t 5 However, from an early date, judges were consid-
ered to have absolute immunity from civil liability.' 6 With time, the absolute
immunity that originated in the judicial sphere was extended to various other
officials, 17 and it became generally true that public officers were immune from
liability resulting from the exercise of discretionary functions.' 8 This immu-
nity usually included public entities in actions based on the discretionary
conduct of their employees.19
Immunity accorded to public, nonjudicial officials is limited to discretionary
activities; no immunity exists for those functions deemed ministerial 2 0 Dis-
cretionary acts have been defined as those requiring "personal deliberation,
decision and judgment", 21 while ministerial acts require only "an obedience to
orders, or the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his
own." 22 Parole decisions have generally been treated as either quasi-judicial
or discretionary, thus insulating parole board members from liability. 2 3
The distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts is, at the very
least, unclear and has been subject to much criticism. 24 In one leading
14. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 29.8 (1956).
15. Id.
16. The doctrine was first enunciated in Floyd & Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1608). It
was adopted in the United States in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). Several
reasons have been advanced to support judicial immunity. See text accompanying note 46 infra
for an enumeration of these reasons. See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21
Minn. L. Rev. 263, 271-72 (1937).
17. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Qfficers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209,
219-20 (1963). Judicial immunity was expanded to encompass other participants in the judicial
process-jurors, witnesses, public prosecutors, and others. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public
Servants, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 303, 313-14 (1959).
18. 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 26.01, at 506 (1958); 2 F. Harper & F. James,
supra note 14, § 29.10, at 1642-43; Jaffe, supra note 17, at 218. "Discretionary" and "quasi-
judicial" were often treated as synonymous and used interchangeably by the courts. Jennings,
supra note 16, at 277. The latter term, however, should perhaps more properly be used only to
refer to those functions closely allied to the judicial process.
19. Thus, while sovereign immunity has been abolished to some extent in a majority of states,
most states that have dealt with the problem have adopted a discretionary function exception. K.
Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies §§ 25.00, 25.13 (Supp. 1976 & 1977). The Federal
Tort Claims Act has expressly provided such an exception to governmental liability. See 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). Davis feels strongly that the immunity granted the government officer
should not result in immunity for the public entity. 3 K. Davis, supra note 18, § 25.17, at 864
(Supp. 1970). While favoring increased immunity for the officer, he advocates the expansion of
liability of the governmental unit, which is better able to bear the loss. 3 K Davis, supra note 18,
§ 26.07, at 542.
20. 3 K. Davis, supra note 18, § 26.02, at 514.
21. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 132, at 988 (4th ed. 1971).
22. Id. at 988-89.
23. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., W. Prosser, supra note 21, at 990, Jaffe, supra note 17, at 218; Jennings, supra
note 16, at 301. The criticism centers on the difficulty in drawing the line between the two since
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decision 25 rejecting a purely literal interpretation of "discretionary," 26 the
court found that a parole agent, in deciding whether to warn of the potentially
dangerous propensities of a youth being placed in a foster home, was not
engaged in a discretionary function. It admitted, however, that, if only a
semantic or literal approach were to be used, the action could as easily be
considered discretionary as ministerial.2 7 To reach its conclusion, the court
chose to focus on the purpose of discretionary function immunity-avoidance
of judicial interference in areas where responsibility for basic policy decisions
is given to coordinate branches of government. 28
Discretionary functions involve a policymaking or judgmental element. 2 9
Immunity is thought to be necessary to allow "government to govern without
fear of liability for errors."'30 When an action is mandatory (and does not
therefore require any exercise of discretion), there is no longer any need for
immunity. Thus, once a policy decision has been made, the actions involved
in executing that policy are not protected by the shield of immunity. In
applying these principles one court has found that the failure of a parole
officer to give adequate warnings to the foster parents of a dangerous youth is
not an aspect of his discretionary power. 3' Neither is the failure of a parole
board to consider information made available to the board and relevant to the
record of a parolee. 32 On the other hand, the basic decision to release a
prisoner on parole is considered discretionary. 3 3 "The decision to parole thus
most official actions require the exercise of at least some discretion. It is also contended that
neither the public interest nor justice supports the distinction. W. Prosser, supra note 21, at 990.
25. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
26. Id. at 787-90, 447 P.2d at 356-58, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 244-46.
27. Id. at 788-89, 447 P.2d at 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245 ("The parole officer's duty might be
classified as 'discretionary': to select for disclosure, from a myriad of possibilities, those elements
of the youth's character and background which would be most helpful to the foster parents and
yet would not endanger the parole effort. It would be equally plausible, on the other hand, to
characterize the officer's duties as embracive of 'ministerial' elements prescribed by the law of
torts: to warn of foreseeable, latent dangers.").
28. Id. at 793, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248. This concern for maintaining separation
of powers is reminiscent of the refusal of courts to decide "political questions." One commentator
has suggested, in fact, that the methods developed by the Supreme Court for dealing with
political questions be used as a model for construing the discretionary function exception.
Separation of powers would be only one of several factors considered in determining whether
immunity exists. Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Exception: Political
Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 930, 975-83 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Separation of Powers].
29. Jones v. Johnson, 402 F. Supp. 992, 998 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
30. Id. at 999.
31. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 797-99, 447 P.2d 352, 363-64, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 251-52
(1968).
32. Jones v. Johnson, 402 F. Supp. 992, 999 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Here, a parolee was convicted
of a crime while on parole. The conviction was subsequently vacated, and the parole board
notified. It was claimed that the board should have considered this change in status in determin-
ing whether to reparole this prisoner.
33. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 795-96, 447 P.2d 352, 361-62, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 249-50
(1968); Adamov v. State, 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 8, 345 N.E.2d 661, 666 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
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comprises the resolution of policy considerations, entrusted by statute to a
coordinate branch of government, that compels immunity from judicial reex-
amination. 3 4
The recent decision in Rieser v. District of Columbia,35 though finding the
particular parole officers liable, did not change the well-settled rule that a
parole decision is discretionary. 36 Plaintiff's daughter was raped and mur-
dered by a parolee who had been assisted by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections in finding employment at the apartment complex
where the victim lived.37 The assigned parole officer had failed to disclose the
complete criminal record of the parolee to the employer38 and had failed to
ensure that the parolee did not do inside work or obtain keys to apartments. 3
9
34. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 795, 447 P.2d 352, 361, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 249 (1968). It
might be logically argued that, if immunity for discretionary functions is designed to protect basic
policymaking, then the decision to have a system of parole and the establishment of standards to
carry out the system should be deemed discretionary. On the other hand, the decision to parole a
particular individual would not be, since it does not involve basic policymaking. One problem
with this type of analysis is that, at present, parole boards do not usually have established criteria
for making decisions. D. Stanley, Prisoners Among Us 47-48 (1976). It has been proposed that
case-by-case decisionmaking be taken over by hearing examiners, while the parole board could
concentrate on establishing criteria for the decisionmaking and on developing policies. National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Parole: National Standards and
Goals, in Probation, Parole and Community Corrections 275 (R. Carter & L. Wilkins eds. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Parole: National Standards]. Under such a bifurcated system, it would
seem that establishing criteria for making release decisions is the sort of basic policy decision
entrusted to a coordinate branch of government that ought to be immune from review. Once
guidelines exist, however, a decision to release would not be entitled to the protection of
immunity.
This type of argument has been rejected by one court, State v. Superior CL, 37 Cal. App. 3d
1023, 112 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1974). It was contended that the decision to release prisoners was
ministerial since it was claimed that the state was negligent in the application of regulations
governing release. The court expressed reluctance to find particular acts involving prisoner
rehabilitation to be ministerial. Id. at 1026, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09. It further stated its belief
that ministerial implementation of correctional programs could not be separated from discretion-
ary decisions made in adopting these programs. Id. at 1027, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (quoting
County of Sacramento v. Superior Ct., 8 Cal. 3d 479, 485, 503 P.2d 1382, 1386, 105 Cal. Rptr.
374, 378 (1972)). California's immunity for parole release decisions is legislatively and not
judicially created; thus, the decision must be read in the light of the statutory provisions. The
statute does not distinguish between discretionary and ministerial acts, but protects all release
decisions. See note 119 infra. A jurisdiction recognizing the distinction might find the argument
more compelling.
35. 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
36. The court noted that plaintiff, apparently assuming that the parole board's failure to
revoke parole was protected by sovereign immunity, did not base his suit on this ground. Id. at
468 n.35.
37. Id. at 464.
38. Id. at 465. The parolee's robbery conviction was revealed, but not his conviction for
attempted rape. No mention was made either of the parolee's earlier commitment to a hospital for
the insane, his poor current psychiatric evaluation, juvenile offenses, or status as a suspect in a
murder and rape-murder which occurred while he was employed in his first job as a parolee. Id.
39. Id. at 466-68.
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The court analyzed the case in traditional terms: the District of Columbia,
when sued for the acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat
superior, is immune from liability if the employee's acts are discretionary, but
not if they are ministerial. 40 While recognizing the difficulty of drawing the
distinction under any particular set of facts, the court found that, in this case,
the parole officer's acts were ministerial, 4 1 because he was involved in the
execution, rather than the formulation, of policy. He had a duty, under the
policy of the Department of Corrections, to disclose the parolee's complete
adult record and to supervise adequately his parole. 4
2
But the Rieser court, in denying immunity to a governmental entity for the
acts of its parole officers, merely relied on the familiar discretionary-
ministerial dichotomy and imposed liability by finding the particular acts to
be ministerial. It is the Supreme Court of Arizona's decision in Grimm v.
Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles43 that is truly novel in holding that
public officers, including parole board members, have only a qualified, rather
than absolute, immunity in the exercise of their discretionary functions. 44
The court first carefully reviewed the policy supporting immunity for ad-
ministrative officials, in particular, analyzing the reasons for granting immu-
nity to judges, and concluded that these reasons are far less applicable to
other public officials. 45 Among the reasons advanced to support judicial
immunity are the saving of judicial time that would otherwise be needed to
defend suits; the prevention of undue influence on judicial action through the
threat of suit; the deterrence of competent persons from judicial service; the
importance of an independent judiciary; the need for finality in the adjudica-
tion of disputes; the existence of adequate alternative remedies (such as
appellate review); the fact that their duty to act is owed to the public and not
to individuals; the unfairness of requiring someone's opinion, and then sub-
jecting him to liability based on another's opinion of the same matter; and
historical reasons. 46
The court found that the importance of an independent judiciary and the
40. Id. at 475.
41. Id. The court defined discretionary acts as those entailed in the formulation of policy,
ministerial acts as those involved in its execution. It went on to hold that if the possibility of
liability would unduly inhibit the officer's ability to carry out his function, the action is discretion-
ary, if it would encourage conscientious performance, the action is ministerial. Id. This test
seems somewhat unworkable in practice-it is often difficult to determine whether the threat of
liability has a positive or negative effect. One commentator has observed that the belief that the
chance of liability would tend to intimidate judicial officers presumes a weakness of character in
such officers. See Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 Yale L.J. 322, 331
(1969).
42. It was also found that any potential liability for negligent performance of these duties
would have the salutary effect of fostering conscientious performance and not deterring it. 563
F.2d at 475.
43. 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977).
44. Id. at 265-66, 564 P.2d at 1232-33.
45. Id. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232.
46. Id. at 264-65, 564 P.2d at 1231-32.
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original historical basis for judicial immunity are completely irrelevant con-
siderations where nonjudicial officials are involved. 47 While the existence of
adequate alternative remedies may justify judicial immunity, the court found
this justification inapplicable to administrative decisions since the crucial
safeguard of judicial review is often completely absent.48 This is especially
true in the case of parole board decisions where there is usually no review of
any sort.4 9 In fact, courts have kept a deliberate hands-off policy with respect
to parole decisions. 50
The unfairness inherent in requiring the exercise of judgment and then
subjecting the decision to review was discounted by the court because the
opinions of administrative officials are given less deference than those of
judges.5 1 The saving of time spent defending suits and the need for finality in
the resolution of disputes were also considered to be less meaningful outside
the judicial context.5 2 Finally, it recognized that there may be situations in
which a duty is owed by nonjudicial officers to individual members of the
public.5 3 The court noted that the reasons most often cited to support immu-
nity are that the threat of suit has a restrictive influence or inhibiting effect on
the official, 54 and that it is necessary to encourage competent persons to seek
office. 55 (In some states these latter arguments lose their force since provision is
made for indemnification of a parole board member sued in his official
capacity.)5 6
47. Id. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232. This is obviously true, yet it may be argued that there is a
need for independence in the other branches of government as well.
48. Id.
49. Parole: National Standards, supra note 34, at 275.
50. L. Carney, Probation and Parole: Legal and Social Dimensions 182. 193 (1977; G.
Killinger, H. Kerper & P. Cromwell, Jr., Probation and Parole in the Criminal Justice System
254 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Killinger].
51. 115 Ariz. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232.
52. Id. In any event, considerations of convenience should not determine the issue of immu-
nity. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 Yale L.J. 322, 331 (1969).
53. 115 Ariz. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232. The circumstances under which such a duty to
individuals exists will be discussed more fully. See notes 77-100 infra and accompanying text.
54. 115 Ariz. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232; W. Prosser, supra note 21, at 987; Jennings, supra
note 16, at 280. Indeed, this rationale is frequently cited by the courts. See Silver v. Dickson, 403
F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990 (1969); Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons
& Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478, 479 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd mem., 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977);
Bricker v. Michigai Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Joyce v. Gilligan,
383 F. Supp. 1028, 1030 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd mere., 510 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1975); Neal v.
McCall, 134 Ga. App. 680, 681-82, 215 S.E.2d 537, 538 (1975).
55. 115 Ariz. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232; Jennings, supra note 16, at 280.
56. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 825 (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-q (McKinney
Supp. 1972-1977). The court in Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240
(1968), noted that the California system of indemnification of a state employee for the good faith
performance of his required duties eliminates this justification for immunity, since the employee
need not fear personal liability. Moreover, the court found it unlikely that the prospect of
government liability would inhibit the employee's exercise of judgment. Id. at 790-93, 447 P.2d at
358-60, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 246-48. Arizona provides that the state obtain insurance for its officers
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Since the court felt that the policy basis for public official immunity is much
weaker than for judicial immunity, it decided on only a partial immunity for
these administrative officials.5 7 This result also followed from its belief that
the discretion and authority of public officials is not equal to that of judges.58
Accordingly, the absolute immunity desirable for judges is not necessary for
these other officials. Thus, the court concluded, parole board members have
only a qualified immunity with respect to their parole decisions.5 9
The doctrine of qualified immunity has been gaining in significance in
recent years. With its decisions in Scheuer v. Rhodes60 and Wood v. Strick-
land,61 the Supreme Court created important exceptions to the principle that
public officials are entitled to absolute immunity from liability in the exercise
of discretionary functions. 62 One court 63 has found the qualified immunity
established by these cases inapplicable to parole board members since, unlike
the executive government officials or school board members in Scheuer and
Wood, parole board members are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity when
they make parole decisions. 64
One of the most important motivations for denying absolute immunity in
Grimm was to provide a curb on what the court viewed as increasingly
against liability for acts performed within the scope of employment. Furthermore, a state officer
is not personally liable for injury resulting from an official act based on the exercise of discretion.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-621(A), (G) (Supp. 1977).
57. 115 Ariz. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232.
58. Id. at 264, 564 P.2d at 1231. The court found that because of their training, as well as
tradition, the trust placed in the judgment of a judge differs from that of an administrative
officer. Id.
59. Id. at 265, 564 P.2d at 1232.
60. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
61. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
62. Both suits were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In Scheuer, the Governor of Ohio
was granted only a qualified immunity based on reasonableness and good faith. 416 U.S. at
247-48. Similarly, in Wood, school board members were found to have only a qualified good faith
immunity. 420 U.S. at 313-22. The Scheuer decision may indeed have marked the end of the
trend toward absolute immunity for almost all public officials. Note, Quasi-Judicial Immunity:
Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 Duke L.J. 95, 99.
The more recent decision in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), confuses the picture
further. There, the Court held that, in initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case, a
prosecutor has absolute immunity from civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at
424-27. It has been suggested that the Court relied heavily on the unique position enjoyed by
prosecutors. See K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies §§ 26.00-2, at 584 (1976).
Nonetheless, it is not clear whether the decision signals a shift away from the trend toward
qualified immunity for nonjudicial government officials evidenced by Schieuer and Wood. It
should be noted that even judicial immunity, once considered sacrosanct, has recently been
challenged. See Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978). Here, however, the Court found that
a judge's approval of a petition for sterilization of a minor was entitled to judicial immunity, even
if his action was erroneous. Id. at 1108-09.
63. Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
64. Id. at 1345. The court found that the parole board acts "as an arm of the sentencing
judge," just as prosecutors do in commencing criminal actions. Id.
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unchecked decisionmaking by administrative officials. 6s The court stated:
While society may want and need courageous, independent policy decisions among
high level government officials, there seems to be no benefit and, indeed, great
potential harm in allowing unbridled discretion without fear of being held to account
for their actions for every single public official who exercises discretion .... In this
day of increasing power wielded by governmental officials, absolute immunity for
nonjudicial, nonlegislative officials is outmoded and even dangerous. 66
The dissent conceded that there might be some administrative officials
whose decisions did not warrant absolute immunity, but felt strongly that
parole board members were not in this category. 67 Rather, it felt parole board
members need the same protection for their discretionary acts as is accorded
the sentencing judge. 68 It has been argued in support of this view that parole
officials bear greater responsibility than the average administrative official
because of the dangerousness of those with whom they must deal. 69 In
addition, the function of a parole board has been likened to that of a judge in
imposing sentence or granting or denying probation.70
It is clear that the functions carried out by parole boards are indeed similar
to those of judges. The parole board has almost unregulated sentencing
powers; in practice, the parole board and not the judge often determines the
length of time an offender will actually serve in prison. 7 1 Unlike judges,
however, the parole board has fewer controls on its behavior, and there is less
protection against abuse. An inmate is usually not represented by counsel at a
parole release hearing.7 2 While judges announce their sentencing decisions in
open court, often giving reasons for the sentence, parole boards operate in
relative secrecy, in closed hearings, and frequently are not required to justify
their decisions.7 3 The lack of an appeal mechanism for most parole decisions
has already been noted. 74 Thus, it would seem that parole boards make their
release decisions without according nearly as much procedural fairness or due
process protection as is available in court. 7s The great power and great
65. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 266, 564 P.2d 1227, 1233
(1977).
66. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 270, 564 P.2d at 1237 (Hays, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Hays, J., dissenting).
69. See Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478, 479 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
aff'd mem., 548 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1977). Of course, this argument can be turned on its
head-i.e., precisely because of the dangerous consequences of parole officers' acts, they should
be subject to some sort of check.
70. See, id.; Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 11S Ariz. 260, 270, 564 P.2d 1227,
1237 (1977) (Hays, J., dissenting).
71. H. Abadinsky, Probation and Parole 169 (1977); L. Carney, supra note 50, at 182. "lTlhe
parole board is a sentencing body like the court." Id. at 185 (italics omittedj.
72. H. Abadinsky, supra note 71, at 179; G. Killinger, supra note 50, at 259-61.
73. H. Abadinsky, supra note 71, at 169, 177; G. Killinger, supra note 50, at 256-61.
74. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
75. L. Carney, supra note 50, at 196; D. Stanley, supra note 34, at 76.
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potential for abuse which has been noted by various observers 76 would lead to
the conclusion that the absolute immunity of parole boards should not be
unlimited.
Should absolute immunity be denied parole board members, several ques-
tions remain. First, is there a duty7 7 owed to individual members of the
public who may be harmed by the parolee? It is generally held that a duty to
perform governmental functions does not run to individual members of the
public, but rather is for the benefit of the public at large. 78 Often, this rule is
cited in suits by members of the public claiming injury resulting from inade-
quate police protection. 79 The main thrust of the arguments in support of the
rule is the protection of the government from a deluge of suits,80 which would
result in the imposition of an overwhelming financial burden on taxpayers.8 '
An exception to the general rule has been recognized when the government
has in some way assumed a special duty to an individual.8 2 Some courts have
found such a special duty to protect those who act as informers in criminal
cases.8 3 The duty arises if the informer is placed in a position of peril as a
result of his assistance to the government.8 4 This creation of a special peril
was the basis on which a duty was found where a parole officer placed a
76. G. Killinger, supra note 50, at 254; Parole: National Standards, supra note 34, at 277.
77. Since a tort consists of a breach of a duty imposed by law, it is necessary to ascertain that
a duty exists. W. Prosser, supra note 21, § 1, at 4. Duty involves the obligation one party has for
the benefit of another. Id. § 53.
78. See Gerneth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109
(1973); Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969); Trautman v. City of
Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 350 A.2d 782 (1975); Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 NY.2d
134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965).
79. See, e.g., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969) (no duty to
motorists injured by persons driving in reckless manner whom police failed to arrest); Trautman v.
City of Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 350 A.2d 782 (1975) (no duty to individual injured as a
result of drag racing permitted by police); Keane v. City of Chicago, 98 111. App. 2d 460, 240
N.E.2d 321 (1968) (no duty to teacher killed by student because of failure to assign police
protection to school). See generally Note, Municipal Tort Liability for Failure To Prcvide
Adequate Police Protection in New York State, 39 AIb. L. Rev. 599, 600-01 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Municipal Tort Liability].
80. Municipal Tort Liability, supra note 79, at 602.
81. See, e.g., Gerneth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1109 (1973). These arguments have been met with some criticism. For example, it has been
pointed out that fears of court congestion are often not borne out, and that the imposition of tort
liability in other areas has not resulted in a crushing financial burden on the government. See
Municipal Tort Liability, supra note 79, at 602.
82. See Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, .521-23, 456 P.2d 376, 379-81 (1969)
(dictum); Trautman v. City of Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, -, 350 A.2d 782, 784 (1975)
(dictum); Keane v. City of Chicago, 98 Ill. App. 2d 460, 462, 240 N.E.2d 321, 322 (1968)
(dictum); Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 391-92, 272
N.E.2d 871, 873-74 (1971) (dictum).
83. See Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Gardner v. Village of
Chicago Ridge, 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966); Schuster v. City of New York, 5
N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
84. Id.
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dangerous youth in a foster home but failed to warn of his violent tenden-
cies. 85 Similarly, in Rieser, the parole officer had a duty to reveal to a
potential employer the parolee's complete criminal record and to make sure
that proper controls were placed on his work. 8 6 This duty was seen by the
court to extend to women tenants living in the apartment complex where the
parolee was employed.8 7
Although a special duty to individual members of the public has sometimes
legitimately been found in parole release decisions because these individuals
have been placed in a position of special danger, such a result is not common.
In Grimm, for example, the parolee shot two strangers in the course of a
robbery. The government could not be found to owe these individuals a
special duty of protection on the ground that it had placed them in a unique
position of peril. Yet the court found that the government, by releasing a
person with known dangerous propensities, had narrowed its duty from one
owed to the public at large to one owed to individuals.8 8 Here the court relied
heavily on the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 319, "Duty of Those in
Charge of Person Having Dangerous Propensities," provides: "One who takes
charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause
bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm."8 9
An earlier decision9" which dealt with the question of the duty owed by the
state to the private citizen to prevent an escaped prisoner from committing
harm concluded that the state did not owe a duty to members of the public to
protect them from the risk of exposure to this prisoner, 91 principally because
the prisoner had a record of nonviolence; thus, an assault by him was not a risk
that could reasonably be foreseen by the jailorsY2 The decision is not con-
tradicted by the Restatement or its application in Grimm, since the Restate-
ment rule applies only where the person to be controlled is dangerous. The
court in Grimm held that a duty is owed to individual members of the public
when a prisoner with a history of violent and dangerous conduct is released. 93
This situation can be further distinguished from the cases holding that no
duty to individuals results from the failure to provide police protection. Such
cases involve inaction on the part of the state;94 parole entails a voluntary
assumption of responsibility for a dangerous person. The court in Grimm
85. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
86. Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
87. Id.
88. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234
(1977).
89. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965).
90. Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955).
91. Id. at 556, 127 N.E.2d at 549-50.
92. Id. at 555, 127 N.E.2d at 549.
93. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234
(1977).
94. See, e.g., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969) (claim based on
the failure of the police to arrest persons driving recklessly).
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correctly noted that while inaction is not usually a basis for liability, negli-
gence in the performance of a duty voluntarily undertaken may well be. 9
In addition, it has been argued that a denial that duty exists is, in essence, a
subterfuge for finding absolute immunity. 96 It has been urged that this "ves-
tige" of sovereign immunity be discarded 97 and that instead liability be
determined on ordinary principles of tort law. 8 It has also been noted that
governmental liability to individuals is often found, for example, in cases
involving the negligent release of mental patients. 99 At least insofar as the
"duty" question is concerned, these cases would seem to be analogous to those
involving parole release.100 Thus, a duty to individual members of the public
should be found when a dangerous prisoner is released on parole and the suit
should be permitted to proceed on the merits.
This raises the second question-what standard of care should be applied in
assessing the parole decision? The court in Grimm relied on section 319 of the
Restatement in establishing the duty owed. This section sets forth a standard
of reasonable care, yet this is not the standard adopted by the court. Rather,
the qualified immunity established by the court requires the avoidance of
gross negligence or recklessness in the release of a highly dangerous prisoner
on parole. 1 1 By statute, parole is authorized in Arizona if there is a reason-
able probability that the parolee will not commit further violations of the
95. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 267, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234
(1977).
96. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 591, 240 N.E.2d 860, 866, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897, 906 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting). See also Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134,
141, 204 N.E.2d 635, 638, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599 (1965) (Desmond, J., dissenting). One of tle
justifications given for absolute judicial immunity is that no duty is owed to individual members
of the public. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra. If absolute immunity is denied, then the
"no duty" rule should not be interposed as a bar to suit.
97. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 592, 240 N.E.2d 860, 867, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897,
907 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); accord, Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 141,
204 N.E.2d 635, 638, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599 (1965) (Desmond, J., dissenting).
98. "To deny liability on ordinary principles of tort law offers a far better approach to the
question of municipal tort liability than the fiction that there is no duty running to the general
public." Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 591, 2.10 N.E.2d 860, 866-67, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897, 906 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
99. Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 140, 204 N.E.2d 635, 638, 256 N.Y.S.2d
595, 599 (1965) (Desmond, J., dissenting); Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 554, 127 N.E.2d 545,
549 (1955).
100. The court in Williams attempted to distinguish the two by defining the purpose of
confinement in a mental institution as restraint and in a jail as punishment. In the latter only a
public duty to punish would be owed. 308 N.Y. at 554-56, 127 N.E.2d at 549. Yet the lack of
duty in this case seems to rest on the fact that the prisoner had a history of nonviolence and that
therefore it would not be reasonably foreseeable that he would commit an assault. See text
accompanying note 92 supra. For a discussion of the mental patient analogy as it relates to a
court's choice of a gross negligence standard of care, see text accompanying notes 110-16.
101. See Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Parole.,, 115 Ariz. 260, 267, 564 P.2d 1227,
1234 (1977).
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law. 1 0 2 The court held that a decision to release would be grossly negligent or
reckless if the entire record of the prisoner indicated violent tendencies and
there is no reasonable basis to believe he has changed. 10 3 No liability was to
be imposed when there was conflicting or contradictory evidence, i.e., when
reasonable minds could differ. 10
The Grimm court felt that this strict standard was justified as striking a
necessary balance between the interest of the public in protection from release
of dangerous persons and the interest of parole board members in freedom
from liability for reasonable decisions. 10 5 The standard of gross negligence is
looked upon with disfavor,10 6 however, and its imposition here may render
almost meaningless the cause of action permitted by the court's rejection of
absolute immunity. The decision restricts plaintiffs because recovery can be
had only when it is shown that there was no reasonable basis for the parole
board's action. 107 The court felt that some limitation was necessary to protect
reasonable parole decisions.' 0 8 The fears expressed by the dissent-that the
courts would be deluged by lawsuits and that parole board members would,
therefore, be hesitant to act' 0 9-undoubtedly influenced the majority. Yet the
question remains whether the adoption of the gross negligence standard was
necessary or whether reasonable parole decisions could have been protected
by an ordinary negligence standard.
The release of mental patients, which would seem to be a suitable model for
comparison, is often judged by a negligence standard." 0 The plaintiff must
show that the psychiatrist making the decision to release either lacked that
degree of skill possessed by psychiatrists in the locality, failed to use reason-
able care in the exercise of his skill, or failed to use his best judgment. I,, The
102. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412 (1976), quoted in Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles,
115 Ariz. 260, 262, 265, 564 P.2d 1227, 1229, 1232 (1977).
103. 115 Ariz. at 267, 564 P.2d at 1234.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 267-68, 564 P.2d at 1234-35.
106. Under general accepted principles of negligence, the standard of care required depends
on the degree of risk. Accordingly, those dealing with dangerous instrumentalities must exercise
greater care since the risk is greater. W. Prosser, supra note 21, § 34, at 180. A different and older
approach recognized distinct degrees of negligence, including gross negligence. The distinction
was criticized because of the difficulty of fixing lines of demarcation and the concept has now
been rejected at common law. Id. at 181-82.
Nonetheless, the idea of degrees of negligence has been adopted in some statutes and the courts
have encountered difficulty in defining gross negligence. While some courts have sought to
distinguish it from recklessness, others have given the terms essentially the same meaning. Id. at
183-85. The Grimm court, in fact, used both terms synonymously. See 1 IS Ariz. at 267, 564 P.2d
at 1234.
107. 115 Ariz. at 267, 564 P.2d at 1234.
108. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
109. 115 Ariz. at 270, 564 P.2d at 1237.
110. See, e.g., Homere v. State, 48 App. Div. 2d 422, 424, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248-49 (1975).
The doctors in a state mental hospital were found negligent for failing to reevaluate their decision
to discharge a patient after he became violent.
111. Schwenk v. State, 205 Misc. 407, 414, 129 N.Y.S.2d 92, 98 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
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point is often made, however, that there is to be no liability for honest errors
of professional judgment' 12 since it is nearly impossible to predict the future
behavior of the released patient. There is a recognition by the courts that the
release of mental patients involves a certain amount of risk, and that no
liability should attach for taking that risk. 113 The Grimm court made it clear
that parole board members should not be held liable for taking the risk
required by statute.' 14
The imposition of liability must be curtailed in this way or few releases
would be made and rehabilitation efforts would be impeded. 115 The cases
involving release of mental patients recognize the need to achieve a balance
between competing interests-the, rehabilitation of the mentally ill and the
protection of the public.1 6 The same balance must be struck in parole release
decisions. Even those advocating suits by crime victims are understandably
reluctant to suggest that the courts attempt to "second-guess" parole boards
when they make mistakes, 117 yet egregious errors made in parole release
decisions should not go without redress. 118 Since it would seem that the
ordinary negligence standard of reasonable care is sufficient to strike the
proper balance, the court's application of gross negligence was unnecessarily
restrictive.
Suits by victims of crime challenging parole release decisions have thus far
been largely unsuccessful. Most courts which have considered the question
have found parole board members (or the governmental unit) absolutely
immune on the ground that such decisions involve the exercise -:f discretion.
There are also statutory provisions in some states granting immunity from
liability for injuries resulting from parole release decisions. 119 Where the
negligence alleged does not involve the release decision itself, but rather
conduct subsequent to that determination, liability has been found. Thus,
failure to warn of the dangerous propensities of a youth being placed in a
foster home 1 20 or failure to relate to a potential employer the complete
112. See, e.g., Taig v. State, 19 App. Div. 2d 182, 183, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (1963); St.
George v. State, 283 App. Div. 245, 248, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150-51, aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 681,
124 N.E.2d 320 (1954).
113. See, e.g., Taig v. State, 19 App. Div. 2d 182, 183, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (1963).
114. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265, 564 P.2d 1227, 1232
(1977).
115. Taig v. State, 19 App. Div. 2d 182, 183, 241 N.Y S.2d 495, 496-97 (1963); St. George v.
State, 283 App. Div. 245, 249, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, 151, aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d
320 (1954).
116. See, e.g., Schwenk v. State, 205 Misc. 407, 415, 129 N.Y.S.2d 92, 99 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
117. See Carrington, supra note 4, at 465.
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 845.8 (West Supp. 1977); Il1. Ann. Stat. ch. 85, § 4-106
(Smith-Hurd 1966); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:5-2 (West Supp. 1977-1978). The California statute, for
example, provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable
for . . . [any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from
determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from determining whether to
revoke his parole or release." Cal. Gov't Code § 845.8(a) (West Supp. 1977).
120. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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criminal record of the parolee21 has been found actionable. However, the
decision to release a prisoner on parole remains protected.
The Grimm decision is a move away from the rigid application of absolute
immunity. It marks an attempt to look at the policy factors supporting the
doctrine and to strike a balance among competing interests. 2 2 The decision to
release a prisoner on parole necessarily entails risks, since future behavior,
particularly of criminals, cannot be predicted with scientific precision. The
imposition of liability on parole board members might well be expected to
inhibit release of prisoners, including those who could return to society and
function well. On the other hand, the doctrine of absolute immunity precludes
review of any parole decision, including those based on incomplete or incor-
rect data, or otherwise carelessly made. As has been noted, 2 3 the resolution
of these conflicting considerations may take some time. Courts will undoubt-
edly be faced with increasing numbers of these suits in the future and will
need to grapple with the difficult policy questions involved.
Jorene R. Frenki
Trademark-§ 368-d Dilution Relief in New York-Abandoning the Con-
fusion/Competition Requirement.-In a departure from the "judicial hesi-
tance"' that has plagued enforcement of the literal terms of New York's
antidilution statute since its passage in 1954,2 the New York Court of
Appeals has recently determined that a distinctive trademark or trade name 3
121. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
122. A discussion of various criteria for determining government tort liability is found in
Separation of Powers, supra note 28, at 975-83. The author suggests that separation of powers
(the basis for the discretionary function exception to liability) should only be one of several factors
to be considered. Id.
123. Carrington, supra note 4, at 465.
1. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 544, 369
N.E.2d 1162, 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (1977).
2. Ch. 628, § 1, 1954 N.Y. Laws. For the text of the statute and its legislative history, see note
36 infra and accompanying text.
3. As used herein, the term "mark" or "name" includes trademarks, trade names, and service
marks.
A trademark "means any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof, adopted
and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by him and to distinguish them from goods
made or sold by others." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 360(a) (McKinney 1968). This statutory definition
embodies the definition of common law trademarks as well. Clairol Inc. v. Gillette Co., 270 F.
Supp. 371, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), affld, 389 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968); see Pulitzer Publishing Co., 82
U.S.P.Q. 229, 231 (Comm'r Patents 1949); 3 IL Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition,
Trademarks, and Monopolies § 65, at 2 (3d ed. 1969).
The term "trade name" means "any name, title, designation, or device lawfully adopted and used
by any person engaged in any business, trade, occupation, or vocation to identify such business,
trade, occupation, or vocation and distinguish it from the business, trade, occupation or vocation or
others whether or not registered, filed or recorded under any law of the state of New York, or of any
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should be protected against the adverse effects of dilution4 even in the absence
of any consumer confision.5 In thus extending the protection afforded trade-
marks and trade names beyond that provided by traditional actions for
trademark infringement and unfair competition, 6 the New York court has
explicitly recognized that the advertising and selling power of the mark itself
is of value to its owner, and that such value should be protected against a
"cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the
business reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark or name." 7 As a
result of this decision, New York joins a growing minority of jurisdictions8
other state, or of the United States of America." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 360(a-iii) (McKinney 1968).
A service mark means "anything used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services
of one person and distinguish them from the services of others and includes without limitation
words, names, symbols, titles, designations, slogans, character names, and distinctive features of
radio or other advertising used in commerce." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 360(a-i) (McKinney 1968).
Both trademarks and trade names were originally covered by the New York antidilution
statute, ch. 453, § 1, 1955 N.Y. Laws; service marks were added by a 1961 amendment, ch. 583,
§ 1, 1961 N.Y. Laws.
4. Dilution is defined as the "gradual whittling away" of a mark or name. Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813,825 (1927). This injury is caused by
the use of a mark or name which is the same as or similar to plaintiff's upon noncompeting.goods or
services of the defendants. Id. at 823-25. For a detailed description of dilution and the interest
which is protected by the New York antidilution statute, see notes 67-94 infra and accompanying
text.
5. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369 N.E.2d
1162, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977). Prior to the Allied decision, it was necessary for a plaintiff to
establish that there was a likelihood that consumers would confuse the source of defendant's
product with that of plaintiff's. Therefore, plaintiff had to establish that the defendant's use of his
mark was likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive the consuming public into believing
that plaintiff was associated with the defendant's product or service. See notes 96-101 irtfra and
accompanying text.
6. In an action for trademark infringement or unfair competition, a plaintiff must establish a
likelihood of consumer confusion. See notes 46, 50 infra and accompanying text. By abandoning
the necessity of establishing confusion under § 368-d of the General Business Law, the New York
Court of Appeals has extended trademark protection by offering a trademark owner relief against
the misuse of his mark in those situations where a finding of confusion is impossible, that is, where
relief under trademark infringement and unfair competition is unavailable. See notes 44-57 infta
and accompanying text. For a discussion of why an antidilution approach, which prescinds from a
finding of confusion, is viewed as a new source of relief-separate and independent from trademark
infringement and unfair competition actions-see note 65 infra.
7. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 544, 369
N.E.2d 1162, 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (1977).
8. In addition to New York, the following states have enacted antidilution statutes: Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 70-550 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-111(c) (West 1969); Del. Code tit. 6, §i 3313 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 495. 151 (West 1972); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-115 (1935); Idaho Code § 48-512 (1977); II. Ann.
Stat. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978); Iowa Code Ann. § 548.11(2) (West Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110B, § 12 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 417.061
(Vernon Supp. 1978); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-122 (1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 350-A:12 (Supp.
1975); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 49-4-11.2 (Supp. 1975); Or. Rev. Stat. § 647.107 (1971); R.I. Gen. Laws §
6-2-12 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
1978] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1317
that have abandoned the necessity of establishing a likelihood of consumer
confusion before the distinctiveness of a mark or name may be protected
"against vitiation or disassociation from the particular product in connection
with which it has been used." 9 Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechan-
ical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977).
The plaintiff in Allied was in the business of providing cleaning and
maintenance services for large office buildings.10 Defendant was primarily
engaged in the installation and repair of heating, ventilation, and air condi-
tioning equipment. Alleging that defendant performed maintenance services
identical to its own, plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from using the word
"Allied" in any way connected with its business.II Plaintiff sought relief upon
alternative theories of unfair competition 12 and violation of New York's
antidilution statute. 13
In granting injunctive relief, the trial court found that the parties were in
actual and potential competition in the cleaning and maintenance industry in
the New York City area, and further, that the auditory and visual similarities
between their names created a likelihood of confusion.' 4 On this basis, the
court concluded that defendant's use of the name "Allied Mechanical" would
result in irreparable injury to plaintiffs reputation, goodwill, and proprietary
business interests, and would thus constitute unfair competition.' s
The appellate division reversed upon four grounds: ' 6 an absence of competi-
tion, an absence of any secondary meaning,' 7 the existence of sophisticated
customers that would "seek the services rather than the name,"' 8 and the fact
that "no user of the services of either party has been or may probably be
Among those states interpreting their antidilution statutes literally are Illinois and lassachu-
setts. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 1963) (interpreting the
Illinois statute); Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D. Mass. 1964)
(Massachusetts statute); Clairol Inc. v. Cody's Cosmetics, Inc., 353 lass. 385, 391, 231 N.E.2d
912, 916 (1967).
9. Schechter, supra note 4, at 825.
10. 42 N.Y.2d at 541, 369 N.E.2d at 1163, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
11. Id. at 541, 369 N.E.2d at 1163, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 629-30.
12. Plaintiff argued, on an unfair competition theory, that because his mark had acquired a
secondary meaning, he was entitled to relief against defendant's appropriation of his goodwill as
evidenced by the similarity in their names. 42 N.Y.2d at 540 (Points of Counsel). For a discussion
of secondary meaning and unfair competition, see note 50 infra and accompanying text.
13. 42 N.Y.2d at 539 (Points of Counsel). See note 36 infra and accompanying text for text of
the New York statute.
14. 42 N.Y.2d at 541, 369 N.E.2d at 1163, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
15. Id.
16. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 55 App. Div. 2d 865, 865-66,
390 N.Y.S.2d I01, 102 (1977) (mem.).
17. Secondary meaning is necessary to establish that a word which is "common" has achieved
the status of a trademark. See note 137 infra and accompanying text. Consequently, when the
appellate division found that plaintiff's name lacked any secondary meaning, relief under any
theory of trademark protection was impossible. See generally 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, §§
77.1-.4(e).
18. 55 App. Div. 2d at 866, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
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confitsed or deceived by any similarity in the names of the parties."' 9 Because
the lower court decision was based upon a finding of unfair competition, the
appellate division reserved upon that ground only, and never discussed the
issue of antidilution.2 0 Plaintiff appealed from this decision.
The court of appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division 2' but re-
jected the interpretation of New York's antidilution statute upon which prior
New York courts had relied. 22 Acknowledging the lack of judicial enthusiasm
for antidilution statutes in general, 23 and New York's in particular, 24 the court
nonetheless definitively determined that in order to frame a complaint under
section 368-d of the New York General Business Law, a plaintiff that possesses
a "strong mark" 25 would no longer have to establish a likelihood of competition
between plaintiff's and defendant's products or services, or consumer confusion
as to the source of origin of those products or services, in order to prevail upon
the merits. 26 The court further noted that although the statute, thus inter-
preted, offers protection against the "whittling away" of a mark or name by its
use upon noncompeting goods, 27 still the plaintiff must possess a strong, dis-
19. Id. at 866, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 102 (emphasis added).
20. See id.
21. 42 N.Y.2d at 546, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y S.2d at 633.
22. Id. at 544-45, 369 N.E.2d at 1165-66, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
23. Id. at 543-44, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 631. TheAllied court noted that courts
which have interpreted the Illinois antidilution statute have refused to allow a plaintiff to bring his
action under a dilution theory where he could frame his complaint as a trademark infringement or
unfair competition action. Id. at 544, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (citing Alberto-
Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1972) ); see Filter Dynamics Int'l
Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 314-15, 311 N.E.2d 386, 398-99 (1974); Edgewa-
ter Beach Apts. Corp. v. Edgewater Beach Mgt. Co., 12 111. App. 3d 526, 534, 299 N.E.2d 548,
554 (1973)). In 1963, however, in Polaroid v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963), the
Seventh Circuit interpreted and applied the Illinois statute according to the plain meaning of Its
terms, reasoning that unless interpreted to exclude the requirement of confusion or competition, the
statute would add nothing to prior law. Id. at 836-37. This approach has also been taken In
Massachusetts. See Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D. Mass. 1964)
(applying Massachusetts law); Clairol Inc. v. Cody's Cosmetics, Inc., 353 Mass. 385, 391, 231
N.E.2d 912, 916 (1967).
24. 42 N.Y.2d at 543-44, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32.
25. Id. at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The Allied court defined a strong
mark as one which is capable of being diluted. Id.; see James Burroughs Ltd. v. Sign of the
Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 & n.17 (7th Cir. 1976). See generally Annot., 148 A.L.R. 12, 26
(1944). Conversely, a weak mark is one that is relatively unknown, or very much like similar marks
or product names. 540 F.2d at 276. For a discussion of trademark distinctiveness, see notes 117-59
infra and accompanying text.
26. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The Allied court found that §
368-d "does not require a showing of confusion or competition." Id. (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the necessity of establishing the absence of any confusion or competition under the
New York statute, see notes 95-114 infra and accompanying text.
27. 42 N.Y.2d at 544, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632. A noncompeting product Is
one that eventually appears in a different market. See 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, §§ 80.3,
82.2(a).
The term "whittling away," as synonymous with dilution, was coined by the original proponent
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tinctive mark 2 -- one capable of being diluted-in order to obtain injunctive
relief29 under the statute. Although the court found that the name "Allied" as
used by the plaintiff lacked any distinctive quality or secondary meaning,30 and
therefore denied the injunction, the impact of this decision lies in the court's
recognition of dilution as a new ground for relief, independent and separate
from the traditional actions of trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion, 3 1 and the court's recognition that a trademark or name must be either
unique or have acquired a secondary meaning before any distinctive quality
attaches. 3
2
I. AVAILABLE TRADEMARK ACTIONS
In addition to the protection of trademarks and trade names afforded by the
traditional actions for trademark infringement 33 and unfair competition,
34
New York, as well as a number of other states, 35 has adopted an antidilution
statute. This statute provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a
mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source
of goods or services.
36
The purpose behind the enactment of this statute was the prevention of trade-
mark dilution, 37 that is, "the whittling away of an established trademark's
of American adoption of a dilution rationale, Dr. Frank Schechter. See Schechter, supra note 4, at
825.
28. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
29. Id. Under § 368-d, a plaintiff is limited to injunctive relief. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 363-d
(McKinney 1968). Furthermore, because dilution is a "cancer" that affects the selling power of a
mark or name, see notes 67-75 infra and accompanying text, it would seem that monetary damages
would be impossible to ascertain.
30. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The court defined a strong,
distinctive mark as one that was either coined, or had acquired a secondary meaning. Id.; see notes
133-51 infra and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of dilution as an injury giving rise to a new cause of action, see note 65
infra.
32. A trademark's distinctive quality is that which enables a trademark to sell the plaintiff's
particular product or service. See notes 166-79 infra and accompanying text. Consequently, be-
cause § 368-d was enacted to protect a mark's selling power, a quality of distinctiveness is essential
to relief under the New York statute. See notes 117-19 infra and accompanying text.
33. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
34. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
35. See note 8 supra for a listing of such states.
36. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1968). Enacted originally in 1954 as § 368-c of the
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, ch. 628 § 1, 1954 N.Y. Laws, the statute incorporated common law rights
against dilution. The section was amended in 1955 to provide for injunctive relief in cases where
there is a "[likelihood of... dilution." Ch. 453, § 1, 1955 N.Y. Laws. Finally, in 1961, the section
was amended to provide for injunctive relief against dilution of a mark or name whether such mark
or name was registered or not. Ch. 583, § 1, 1961 N.Y. Laws.
37. See notes 67-77 infra and accompanying text.
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selling power and value through unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar
products. '38 Without such a statute, a plaintiff seeking to prevent the use of his
mark by another would have to frame his complaint within the strictures of an
action for either trademark infringement or unfair competition. A brief review
of these actions and the interests they were des;igned to protect, therefore, is
useful in determining both the legislative intent behind the enactment of section
368-d, and the Allied court's interpretation and application of that intent.39
Historically, two causes of action have existed to protect the owner of a mark
from its improper4" use by another-that is, trademark infringement and un-
fair competition. 4 1 Trademark infringement developed as the remedy designed
to protect technical42 trademarks-that is, coined, arbitrary, or fanciful
marks.4 3 In an action for trademark infringement brought pursuant to either
New York 4 or federal45 law, it is necessary to show that the defendant's use of
the mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive the consuming
public into believing that defendant's product or business is in some way asso-
ciated or affiliated with plaintiff's. 4 6
38. 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 49.
39. The Allied court's interpretation of § 368-d was based upon its understanding of the
legislative intent behind the enactment of that statute. 42 N.Y.2d at 542, 369 N.E.2d at 1164, 399
N.Y.S.2d at 630.
40. "Improper" is used to mean an unauthorized use of another's trademark or trade name.
41. A detailed analysis of the origins of both trademark infringement and unfair competition
actions is beyond the scope of this Note. For a full discussion, see generally 1-3 R. Callmann, The
Law of Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies 13d ed. 1967).
42. Technical trademarks were those that could be appropriated to the use of one person, and
could be registered under existing trademark statutes. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 66.1, at 21.
Nontechnical trademarks, or trade names, were those trade designations that failed to qualify
under the above standards. Id. at 21-22.
43. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 66.1. Marks such as "Kodak," "Exxon," "Xerox," and
"Coke" would fall within this category of "invented" marks.
44. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-b (McKinney 1968). The New York statute reads: "[Any
person who shall
(a) use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable
imitation of a mark registered under this article in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive as to the source or origin of such goods or services; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such mark and apply such reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used upon or in conjunction with the sale or other distribution in this
state of such goods or services; shall be liable." Id.
45. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1976).
46. 42 N.Y.2d at 543, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.Zd at 631; see James Burrough Ltd. v.
Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976); B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement
Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1261 (5th Cir. 1971); General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F.
Supp. 359, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Chips 'n Twigs, Inc. v. Chip-Chip Ltd., 414 F. Supp. 1003, 1013
(E.D. Pa. 1976); David B. Findlay v. Findlay, 18 N.Y.2d 12, 19, 218 N.E.2d 531, 534, 271
N.Y.S.2d 652, 655, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); Dell Publishing Co. v. Stanley Publications,
Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 126, 134, 172 N.E.2d 656, 660, 211 N.Y.S.2d 393, 399 (1961). See generally 3 R.
Callmann, supra note 3, § 80, at 538 n.2, § 80.6, at 559.
In an action for infringement, what is infringed is the "right of the public to be free of confusion
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As the law evolved, the protection afforded by an action for trademark
infringement was supplemented by a broader remedy 47-an action for unfair
competition.4 8 This action was intended to protect the use of unregistered
trademarks as well as trade names. 49 Like trademark infringement, an action
for unfair competition requires a showing of a likelihood of consumer confusion
in order to state a cause of action."0 Thus, in the course of prohibiting a
manufacturer of razor blades ("Waterman") from using the famous mark of a
maker of fountain pens ("Waterman's"), Judge Learned Hand hypothesized
that "[i]t would be hard.., for the seller of a steam shovel to find ground for
complaint in the use of his trade-mark on a lipstick."s' According to conven-
tional doctrine, therefore, an owner's power to prohibit unauthorized use of his
mark ceases at the point where the likelihood of consumer confusion becomes
too attenuated.5 2
and the synonymous right of a trademark owner to control his product's reputation." James
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d at 274. See generally 3 R. Callmann, supra
note 3, § 84.1.
47. It is a familiar axiom that the law of trademark infringement is only a part of the broader
law of unfair competition. See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372. 381 (1926);
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916). See generally 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 67.1, at 53.
48. See Dell Publishing Co. v. Stanley Publications, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 126, 133, 172 N.E.2d 656,
660, 211 N.Y.S.2d 393, 398 (1961). The law of unfair competition is not limited to protection of
trademarks and trade names, but encompasses fraudulent or deceptive business practices gener-
ally, for example, unfair advertising and pricing, unfair interference with a competitor's business
relations, and misappropriation of a competitor's values. See generally 1-2 R. Callmann, The Law
of Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies (3d ed. 1967).
49. See 1 R. Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies § 4.1, at
109 (3d ed. 1967).
50. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
909 (1960); Field Enterprises Educ. Corp. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 382, 390
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); 42 N.Y.2d at 543, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 631; Dell Publishing Co.
v. Stanley Publications, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 126, 134, 172 N.E.2d 656, 660, 211 N.Y.S.2d 393, 399
(1961); Antidefamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 72 Misc. 2d 847,
857, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 545-46 (Sup. Ct. 1972); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 80.6.See generally 1
R. Callmann, supra note 49, §§ 4-8.4.
In New York, statutory unfair competition in the area of Fair Trade law is defined as: -Wilfully
and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipu-
lated . . . ." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369-b (McKinney 1968).
Unfair competition, as applied to trademarks and trade names, rests upon the principle that no
one has the right to represent his goods in such a manner as to mislead a purchaser into believing
that he is buying the goods of another. Corning Glass Works v. Coming Cut Glass Co., 197 N.Y.
173, 178-79, 90 N.E. 449, 450 (1910). At one time it was necessary to show, in an action for unfair
competition, that plaintiff's mark or name had acquired a secondary meaning. Gradually, how-
ever, courts have begun to recognize that unfair competition turns upon whether or not the acts of
the defendant can be characterized as unfair, and not upon the acquisition of a secondary meaning.
See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Contra, Sample, Inc.
v. Porrath, 41 App. Div. 2d 118, 341 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1973), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 961, 309 N E.2d 133,
353 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1974). See generally I R. Callmann, supra note 49, §§ 4-8.4.
51. L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1934).
52. See notes 46, 50 supra and accompanying text.
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By requiring a finding of confusion among the purchasing public as to the
source of two products or services, "American trade identity law [has been]
limited exclusively to protection of the identifying function of marks and
names."5 3 Traditional trademark law, in other words, views the function of a
mark or name as solely indicating source of origin;5 4 and the trademark owner's
rights in his mark are limited to protecting this function. 5" An action for trade-
mark infringement or unfair competition, therefore, has always been structured
to prohibit only the deceit arising from confusion of source.5 6 This view con-
templates the protection of the public against deception rather than the
safeguarding of a property or quasi-property right in the mark per se.
5 7
Since both an action for trademark infringement and an action for unfair
competition seek to prohibit the public deception which is present when two
products or services are confusingly similar, a trademark owner may prohibit
the improper use of his mark by a noncompetitor only when the noncompeting
goods or services are so related that the maker of one may be assumed to be the
maker of the other, that is, when the products or services are so kindred that
one may believe that plaintiff has or may have expanded his business so as to
produce the article in question.5 8 Consequently, where two products are so
distinctly unrelated as to suggest no possibility of confusion, relief under con-
ventional trademark doctrines will not be awarded. 59
Such a limited view of the function of trademark protection has been severely
criticized. 60 It is argued that even when the products are clearly unrelated,
defendant's continued use of a mark that is the same as or similar to plaintiffs
will do injury to the mark itself-although not to the public. This injury, it is
53. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress
and Prospects, 71 Nw. L. Rev. 618, 629 (1976); see Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 412 (1916).
54. Schechter, supra note 4, at 822.
55. It is axiomatic that when a consumer believes that the manufacturer of defendant's product
is plaintiff, then plaintiff's mark has failed to identify plaintiff's product as the only one manufac-
tured by that plaintiff.
56. Pattishal, supra note 53, at 625. Protection is also offered to the owner's right to control the
reputation of his product. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274
(7th Cir. 1976) ("What is infringed is the right of the public to be free of confusion and the
synonymous right of a trademark owner to control his product's reputation.").
57. Note, Service-Mark Registration and Anti-Dilution in New York, 36 St. Johns L. Rev. 187,
192 (1961); see W. Derenberg, Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair Trading 47-55 (1936). Callmann
notes a general judicial reluctance to recognize a trademark as property. 3 R. Callmann, supra note
3, § 84.2, at 960; see note 169 infra and accompanying text.
58. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 954.
59. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2.
60. Schechter, supra note 4, at 821-22. Schechter believed it "archaic" to view the function of
trademarks as an indicator of source of origin. Id. at 822. By contrast, he argued that "the
preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its
protection." Id. at 831 (emphasis added). It is because of this attack on the traditional view that
some commentators feel that Schechter's concept was met with such judicial reluctance among
courts established in the doctrines of traditional trademark protection. 3 R. Callmann, supra note
3, § 84.2, at 959.
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urged, is manifested in the loss of any distinctiveness 6 I a mark may possess
when numerous similar marks are present in the same market.62 Although a
finding of confusion is necessarily impossible to establish, 63 and hence conven-
tional trademark law unavailable, unless a remedy were available whereby a
party could enjoin the use of his mark or name upon noncompeting goods or
services, the distinctiveness of that party's mark or name would eventually be
destroyed through this "watering down" effect known as dilution. 6 Accord-
ingly, a new basis for trademark protection, 65 offering relief against dilution of
a mark's distinctiveness in the absence of any likelihood of confusion or compe-
tition, has developed in the past 50 years. 66
I. DILUTION
A. The Interest Defined
According to the proponents of dilution, 67 the distinctive quality which cer-
tain marks possess surpasses the traditional function of identification of origin
and reflection of goodwill, and attains an intrinsic value of its own based upon
61. See notes 117-59 infra and accompanying text.
62. A distinctive quality cannot be diluted unless the diluting mark of defendant is seen by the
consuming public. See notes 67-77 infra and accompanying text. Consequently, defendant's mark
must be used within the same viewing market as plaintiff's.
63. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
64. 3 R_ Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 954. Dr. Schechter urged protection of the distinc-
tive quality of a mark because a mark's uniqueness is of paramount concern to its owner. See
Schechter, supra note 4, at 822. See also Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks,
43 Fordham L. Rev. 363 (1974).
65. Whereas actions for trademark infringement and unfair competition are designed to protect
a mark or name from its use upon similar products or services, the dilution doctrine is applicable to
situations of dissimilar goods and services. See notes 72-75 infra and accompanying text. "Since the
[defendant's] uses are... nonconfusing, dilution must be an independent ground for relief." Note,
Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-The-Wisp?, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 520, 529 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Harvard Note].
Furthermore, whereas trademark infringement and unfair competition are designed to prevent
the public deception which arises when the defendant uses plaintiff's mark upon similar goods, the
dilution doctrine is designed to prevent the "whittling away" of a value inherent in the mark itself.
See notes 68-75 infra and accompanying text. Because the dilution doctrine protects the value of the
mark itself, and does not protect against public deception, it has no connection with those interests
that conventional trademark law will protect: "Once it is decided to protect the distinctiveness of
marks, courts ought not to be required to wade first through Lanham Act and unfair competition
counts . . . ." Harvard Note, supra at 529.
The statutory language of § 368-d supports the proposition that antidilution is an independent
ground for relief. "Likelihood... of dilution," the statute reads, "[is] a groundfor injunctive relief."
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1968) (emphasis added).
66. Dr. Schechter proposed American adoption of the dilution doctrine in his 1927 Harvard
article, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1927). The doctrine
had its origins thirty years earlier, however, in Europe, in the English case of Eastman Photo-
graphic Materials Co. v. John Griffith Corp., 15 R-O.C. 105 (1898). Derenberg, The Problem of
Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 439, 448-49 (1956).
67. Dilution, here, is used to mean the doctrine of dilution, and not the injury that is dilution.
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its selling power. 68 This concept recognizes that certain marks or names-those
known as distinctive marks or names69-are not merely symbols of goodwill,
but imprint upon the public mind a guarantee of satisfaction with the product
such mark identifies and, more importantly, create a desire for further satisfac-
tions.70 Because distinctive marks are the effective agents for the creation of
goodwill, the marks themselves actually sell the owner's product or service,
rather than simply identify that product's origins. It is that selling power which
makes these marks distinctive and sets them apart from those marks that
simply identify a product's source of origin. Correspondingly, the more distinc-
tive the mark, the more effective is its selling power. 71
Unless the owner of a distinctive mark were able to enjoin the use of his mark
upon noncompeting goods, 72 therefore, the distinctiveness of his mark would
eventually be diluted, with a concomitant loss of sales. 73 To the extent that his
mark no longer evokes only images of steam shovels, for example, in the mind
of an audience that now associates it with cosmetics as well, the commercial
interests of the owner have been jeopardized. As the Allied decision recognized:
"It is not difficult to imagine the possible effect which the proliferation of
various . . . businesses utilizing the name Tiffany's would have upon the
public's association of the name Tiffany's solely with fine jewelry. '74 Conse-
quently, proponents of antidilution protection seek to prohibit noncompeting,
improper use of these distinctive marks and thereby protect the commercial
interests of their owner.75
Since the value of distinctive marks is rooted in their selling power, protec-
tion against dilution is extended to them regardless of whether or not confusion
or competition might be found, where that power is threatened by a gradual
"whittling away." Because dilution has no relation to the issue of confusion or
competition, it is significantly different from trademark infringement or unfair
competition actions-where confusion or competition is present the proper
68. Schechter, supra note 4, at 813-19; see 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 955 ("The
selling power of the mark is realistically dependent upon its distinctiveness.'). Although every
trademark identifies the source of the product to which it is attached, see notes 53-54 supra and
accompanying text, only a few marks or names are "shining lights" that have the ability to sell the
product, see note 71 infra and accompanying text.
69. See 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 84-2, at 955.
70. Schechter, supra note 4, at 818-19.
71. Id. at 819.
72. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Callmann notes that the gravamen of a dilution
complaint is that the continuing use of plaintiff's mark upon completely unrelated products or
services will inexorably dilute the value of that mark. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 954.
73. "This injury differs materially from that arising out of orthodox confusion; if the similarity
between the marks in question provokes confusion, the result thereof is an immediate or imminent
loss of sales, because confusion tends to divert potential patronage from the plaintiff to the defen-
dant. Such confusion creates an immediate injury, while dilution is a cancer which, if allowed to
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark." 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, §
84.2, at 955.
74. 42 N.Y.2d at 544-45, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
75. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
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remedy is an action for trademark infringement or unfair competition, 76 where
neither are present dilution is the injury to be enjoined."7
B. The New York Statute
New York adoption of the dilution doctrine began in the courts in 1932.78 In
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc.,7 9 the famous jeweler sought to
enjoin the continued use of its name in connection with a motion picture house.
Although there was testimony to the effect that the use of the word "Tiffany" in
defendant's motion pictures "caused confusion in [the public's] minds and led
them to believe that plaintiff was connected with the production of defendant's
pictures,"8' 0 yet the court decided against the defendant on the ground that
"[tihe real injury... [was] 'the gradual whittling away.., of the identity and
hold upon the public mind of [plaintiffs] name.' "81 In this case, although the
court quotes a passage from Schechter's proposal, '8 2 the dilution doctrine was
not unequivocally accepted-the court based its holding upon the presence of
consumer confusion.8 3 Subsequent pre-statutory antidilution cases8 4 continued
to rest their holdings upon a finding of a likelihood of confusion or competition,
although they acknowledged that a defendant's "wrongful" attempt to suggest
sponsorship by the plaintiff warranted "relief to prevent confusion in the public
mind as well as dilution of plaintiffs' trade name."85
Persuaded by the rationale of the dilution theory 6 and desiring to afford
injunctive relief8 7 against use of a distinctive mark upon "dissimilar" or "dispa-
rate" products, 8 the New York Legislature enacted section 368-d of the Gen-
eral Business Law to supplement the traditional actions of trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition. This section was designed to codify and expand
76. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
77. See 3 R Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 958; note 116 infra.
78. The case of Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods. Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct.),
aft'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y.S. 821 (1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933), is
generally considered one of the cornerstones of dilution theory in America. Pattishall, supra note
53, at 619, 619 n. 16. For a discussion of the Tiffany decision, see notes 79-83 infra and accompany-
ing text.
79. 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y.S. 821(1932),
aff'd, 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933).
80. Id. at 681, 264 N.Y.S. at 461.
81. Id. at 681, 264 N.Y.S. at 462.
82. Id. at 681-82, 264 N.Y.S. at 462.
83. See id. at 683, 264 N.Y.S. at 463.
84. See, e.g., John Forsythe Co. v. Forsythe Shoe Corp., 234 App. Div. 355, 254 N.Y.S. 584
(1932); Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N.Y.S. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
85. Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 759, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
86. See 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49.
87. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
88. 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 49-50. For a discussion of the application of the dilution doctrine
to noncompeting goods situations only, see notes 61-64 supra, notes 104-12 infta and accompany-
ing text.
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New York common law8 9 which, as noted above, gave limited recognition to a
dilution tort, but carried over the confusion requirement from infringement and
unfair competition actions.90 However, since its inception in 1954, the New
York antidilution statute has been the subject of disdain9 1 and misunderstand-
ing. 92 Until the court of appeals in Allied announced what it would consider the
rudiments of a dilution complaint, there had been no acceptance of the literal
terms of the statute. 93 As one commentator, addressing all state antidilution
statutes, has stated: "One encounters a generalized judicial reluctance to be-
lieve that state dilution statutes really mean what they say." 94
C. Abandoning the Confusion/Competition Requirement
The language of the statute notwithstanding, 9- New York courts, both state
and federal, have, until Allied, read into section 368-d a requirement of some
showing of "confusion, fraud, deception or 'palming off.' "96 Whereas the terms
of the statute clearly seem to have eliminated the need for proving any degree of
confusion as to source in order to enjoin continuing dilution, the substance of
the statute had been consistently undermined by the courts. 97 Although the
89. 1954 Legis. Ann. 49, 50. The proposed bill was viewed as a codification, "but a necessary
one." Id. Judge Lumbard had stated that he did not think that dilution existed in New York as part
of the common law of unfair competition. See Dawn Donu.t Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267
F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959).
90. See notes 79-85 supra and accompanying text.
91. For example, the district court in New York noted that the dilution doctrine "[carries] little
weight in the Second Circuit." Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861, 866
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963).
92. Pattishall, supra note 53, at 621.
93. The federal courts in New York, although purportedly applying § 368-d, have largely
ignored its provisions. See Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F.
Supp. 1128, 1233-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Allstate Driving School, Inc., 301
F. Supp. 4, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Haviland & Co. v. Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp.
928, 956-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); G. B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorillard Co., 114 F. Supp. 621,
630-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'dmem., 210 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1954). All of these cases focused upon a
finding of confusion, noting that a dilution doctrine has not been unqualifiedly accepted in New
York and that, absent any confusion, relief will be summarily denied under § 368-d.
94. 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:13, at 157 (1973).
95. For the text of the statute, see text accompanying note 36 supra.
96. Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 45 Misc. 2d 161, 168, 256 N.Y.S.2d 239,
246 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, mem., 23 App. Div. 2d 829, 259 N.Y S.2d 377 (1965); see cases cited note 97
infra. Suits for unfair competition are usually founded upon the damage to the trade of the
complainant by the fraudulent "passing off" of the goods of one manufacturer or dealer for those of
another. Palming off, therefore, is a species of fraud or deceit. Societe Comptoir de l'Industrie
Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
See generally 74 Am. Jur. 2d Trademarks and Tradename's §§ 84-176 (1974).
97. The district court in Haviland & Co. v. Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), expressed the common New York view when it stated: "Plaintiff cannot claim
right to relief under [§ 368-d], since it has failed to show likelihood of confusion or unfair intent on
the defendants' part."Id. at 957; see Epitome Restaurant, Inc. v. Heublein, Inc., 174 U.S.P.Q. 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Exquisite Form Indus., Inc. v. Exquisite Fabrics of London, 378 F. Supp. 403,
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414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631, 639 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1972); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Chandris America Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Girl Scouts of the United
States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Allstate Driving School, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 4, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Geisel v. Poynter
Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); National Color Laboratories v. Phillip's
Foto Co., 273 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Field Enterprises Educ. Corp. v. Grosset
& Dunlap, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 382, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran,
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861,866 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963); G.B. Kent & Sons,
Ltd. v. P. Lorillard Co., 114 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mer., 210 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1954);
Rainbow Ranch Corp. v. Rainbow Shops, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 808, 812, 392 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct.
1977); The Shadow Box, Inc. v. Drecq, 71 Misc. 2d 733, 794, 336 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1972);
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 72 Misc. 2d 847, 860,
340 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Tiffany & Co. v. L'Argene Prods. Co., 67 Misc. 2d 384,389, 324
N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Pocket Books, Inc. v. Dell Publishing Co., 49 rsc. 2d 252, 255, 267
N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 45 Misc. 2d 161,
165-66, 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245-46, aff'd mem., 23 App. Div. 2d 829, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1965). But
see Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United Merchants &
Mfrs., Inc. v. Amtex Fabrics, Inc., 29 Misc. 2d 86, 212 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. CL 1961).
Various theories have been offered as to why the courts so stubbornly insisted upon a showing of
confusion before relief from dilution would be granted. It has been suggested by a few commen-
tators that some of the misinterpretation accorded dilution derived from the ill-advised language of
the statute. See J. Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 5.05(9), at 5-42 (1974); Derenberg,
supra note 63, at 451; Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 532. For example, the New York statute is
limited to "cases of infringement ... or... unfair competition." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369-d
(McKinney 1968). Such a limitation is necessarily contradictory on its face because, whereas
traditional trademark law was designed to protect against the deceit arising from confusion of
source, dilution protects the value of the mark itself. See Pattishall, supra note 53, at 625; notes
53-66 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, the "notwithstanding" clause invites the view
that the statute was intended to dispense with the necessity of establishing actual, as opposed to
probable, confusion or competition. Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 529.
Another possible explanation for judicial mistrust of the doctrine stems from the fear that
protection of a mark's distinctiveness will invite abuse by monopoly interests, thus diminishing the
free use of the language, and, as one court stated, "swallow[ing up all competition in the claim of
protection against trade name infringement." Coffee Dan's, Inc. v. Coffee Don's Charcoal Broiler,
305 F. Supp. 1210, 1217 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
"Perhaps some of the resistance to the doctrine of dilution is attributable to judicial unwillingness
to recognize a trademark as property and an understandable antipathy to modern advertising." 3
R_ Callmann, supra note 3, at 960. One author contended that the antidilution concept would never
influence the courts because, as opposed to the confusion approach, it ignored the public and based
its relief entirely upon injury to a private interest in the distinctive mark's property rights. Zlinkoff,
Monopoly Versus Competition, 53 Yale L.J. 514 (1944).
The statute has also been criticized for the absence of any definition of the term "dilution."
Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 529; see notes 160-79 infra and accompanying text.
Again, many courts and some commentators have indicated concern that an unlimited im-
plementation of the statute would afford excessively broad protection. See Exquisite Form Indus.,
Inc. v. Exquisite Fabrics of London, 378 F. Supp. 403, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 2 J. McCarthy,
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:16 (1973); Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 529. They
have noted with alarm the consequences of protecting the myriad of common, although valid,
marks from dilution by prohibiting their use on all except one merchant's line of products. See 2 J.
1328 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
statute was intended to provide relief against the improper use of a mark in
precisely those situations where a confusion finding could not be established, 98
injunctive relief was made contingent upon the existence of some degree of
confusion. Thus, the distillers of "Beefeater" gin were granted an injunction
under section 368-d to prohibit "The Beefeater" restaurant from continued use
of that name because the court found a likelihood of confusion between the
parties. 99 But the statute would not sustain the issuance of an injunction in
Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 100 where it was determined that
defendant's use of the phrase "Joy of Bathing" on a bath preparation would not
be likely to mislead purchasers of plaintiff's perfume "Joy" into believing that
defendant's product came from the same source as plaintiffs cosmetics. 10' By
requiring a showing of confusion before an injunction would be ordered, the
courts thus rendered section 368-d superfluous, since it offered no greater relief
than that which was available under traditional doctrines of trademark law.
Although it recognized the "absence of judicial enthusiasm for the anti-
dilution statutes, 10 2 the Allied court nevertheless believed that section 368-d
was intended to extend trademark protection beyond that provided by actions
for trademark infringement and unfair competition. 0 3 The court found sup-
port for this proposition in the legislative history of the statute. The court
reasoned that since the New York statute was expressly designed to prevent the
unauthorized use of the same mark upon, for example, jewelry and motion
pictures,1 0 4 radios and razor blades,10 5 or tobacco and shirts, 0 6 it was neces-
sarily intended to apply to the unauthorized use of a mark on "dissimilar,"' 10 7
McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:14 (1973); Harvard Note, supra note 65, at
527-28; 17 Vand. L. Rev. 627, 632 (1964).
Disregarding this extended history of cases that have required a confusion finding under § 368-d
and the wealth of criticism which that requirement provked, the dissent in Allied nevertheless
stated that the New York appellate courts had never accepted the view that confusion was funda-
mental to a dilution action. 42 N.Y.2d at 549, 369 N.E.2d at 1169, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 635 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting). In support of this statement, Judge Cooke cited Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 49 Misc. 2d 252, 267 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1966). In that case, however, the court
never reached the issue of the necessity of establishing confusion. Finding that the plaintiff had not
established dilution, and finding further that the plaintiff had acquiesced in defendant's marketing
of his product, the court, in a per curiam decision, affirmed the lower court determination. Id.
98. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
99. James Burrough, Ltd. v. Ferrara, 8 Misc. 2d 819, 822, 169 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95 (Sup. Ct.
1957).
100. 201 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963).
101. Id. at 866.
102. 42 N.Y.2d at 544, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632; see note 97 supra.
103. Id. at 544, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
104. See 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 50 (citing Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc., 147 Misc.
679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y.S. 821 (1932), aft'd, 262 N.Y.
482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933)).
105. See 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 50 (citing Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163
Misc. 52, 296 N.Y.S. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ).
106. See 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 50 (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt
Shop, 3 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929)).
107. 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 49.
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"disparate," 10 8 or noncompeting goods and services.' 0 9 Protection of a mark
against similar improper use by a noncompetitor under traditional trademark
law was more limited, as evidenced by the necessity of proving a likelihood of
consumer confusion. 110 As theAllied court noted, however, where a plaintiff is
required to establish a likelihood that the public will confuse defendant's goods
or services with his own, protection of a mark against dilution of its value by
continued misuse will be "difficult to secure."'1 "It is for this reason," the court
of appeals continued, "that section 368-d specifically provides that an injunc-
tion may be obtained notwithstanding the absence of competition or confl-
sion." 112
The Allied court found further support for its decision in the legislative intent
to protect the value of a mark itself, and not to prevent public deception.," 3
Consequently, the court noted that "it would be of no significance under our
statute that Tiffany's Movie Theatre is not a competitor of, nor likely to be
confused with Tiffany's Jewelry.""1 4
The holding of the Allied court will not only aid prospective dilution plain-
tiffs, but will extend the scope of trademark protection to heretofore remediless
plaintiffs. Freed from the burden of proving confusion, plaintiff should have an
easier time establishing his right to relief under section 368-d. This, in turn,
should mean that many more owners of distinctive marks, who previously
could not establish confusion, will now be able to bring antidilution actions.
Most importantly, the Allied decision extends trademark protection into an
area where such protection was legislatively mandated, but not enforced by the
courts. Is By abolishing the confusion requirement, 1 1 6 the Allied decision ex-
108. Id. at 50.
109. 42 N.Y.2d at 544, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
110. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
111. 42 N.Y.2d at 543, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. 42 N.Y.2d at 544, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (The "evil which the
Legislature sought to remedy was not public confusion.., but a cancer-like growth of dissimilar
products or services which [feed] upon.., an established distinctive trade-mark or name.").
114. Id., 369 N.E.2d at 1165-66, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
115. As noted, although the New York Legislature intended that § 368-d be applied in cases
where a confusion finding was impossible, the courts applied the statute only where such confusion
was present. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
116. The dissent noted that although the New York statute provides relief in the absence of
confusion, it does not mandate that there be no confusion or competition before an injunction will
be awarded. 42 N.Y.2d at 547, 369 N.E.2d at 1167, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 634 (Cooke, J., dissenting). It
argues that there is no basis in the language of § 368-d for concluding that the enactment was not
intended to provide a remedy for dilution caused by the use of a distinctive mark on similar
products or services. Id. (Cooke, J., dissenting).
The dissent is concerned with what it considers a limiting interpretation of § 368-d. It apparently
believed that by limiting § 368-d to cases of noncompeting products or services, the majority has
failed to offer antidilution protection to those owners whose marks are used on similar goods or
services, and that such protection is needed. This concern, however, stems from a misunderstand-
ing of both the dilution doctrine, and the relief available through conventional trademark actions.
Although some commentators note that even in cases of confusion or competition incidental
damage is done to the distinctiveness of a mark, see 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 953-54;
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tends trademark protection against the appropriation of distinctive marks by a
noncompetitor.
Ill. DISTINCTIVENESS-DEFINING THE NEW STANDARD
In extending the scope of available trademark protection, the Allied court
noted that whereas a plaintiff is clearly no longer put to proof of a likelihood of
confusion, not every plaintiff whose mark or name is used upon noncompeting
products or services will be entitled to antidilution relief. 117 Although the legis-
lature might conceivably have prohibited all improper uses of an existing
mark, 118 the Allied court noted that, before an injunction may be awarded
under the statute, a showing of trademark distinctiveness be established.it 9
Consequently, a quality of distinctiveness is a condition precedent to antidilu-
tion protection-that which may be diluted must possess trademark distinc-
tiveness. The court of appeals thus qualified the scope of its holding by limiting
section 368-d relief to those plaintiffs whose distinctive marks or names have
been used upon noncompeting goods or services.
Limiting application of the statute to distinctive marks is a logical adaptation
of the dilution doctrine. Designed to protect the selling power of the mark per
se, 120 the dilution doctrine is applicable only to those marks or names that have
the ability to create a desire in the consumer for the plaintiffs product or
service. 121 A mark or name that only identifies the source of the plaintiff's
product or service fails in this regard. 122 A distinctive mark, however, whether
by its uniqueness or inventiveness, 123 does instill in the public's mind a desire to
Pattishall, supra note 53, at 622; Schechter, supra note 4, at 831, where confusion or competition
exists, trademark infringement and unfair competition, and not antidilution, are the proper reme-
dies. Where confusion or competition do not exist, dilution is the injury to be prevented. See 3 R.
Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 958. See also Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 529. This Is
necessarily true because the dilution doctrine was intended to fill the void left open by conventional
trademark law. See notes 60-66 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, although a distinctive
mark may be diluted by its use upon confusingly similar pn:,ducts or services, the prevention of that
injury is possible when the trademark owner seeks to enjoin the defendant's confusing use of the
owner's mark by an action for trademark infringement or unfair competition. By removing the
diluting mark from the market through reliance on conventional doctrines, the owner removes any
possibility of further dilution caused by that mark. Thus, allowing an owner to bring a § 368-d
action where confusion exists is not only contrary to the legislative intent in enacting that statute,
but is an unnecessary duplication of trademark protection.
117. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
118. The federal district court in Massachusetts, for example, in what has been described as an
indiscriminate application of that state's statute, see Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 530, con-
cluded that "Premier"--among the weakest, most diluted names--was entitled to protection under
a dilution theory. Francis H. Leggett & Co. v. Premier Packing Co., 140 F. Supp. 328 (D. Mass.
1956).
119. 42 N.Y.2d at 544-45, 369 N.E.2d at 1165-66, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632; see 1954 N.Y. Legis.
Ann. 49, 49-50.
120. See 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 49; notes 160-79 infra and accompanying text.
121. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
122. Id.
123. For a discussion of the "quality" of distinctiveness, see notes 152-59 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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purchase the particular product. A quality of distinctiveness, consequently, not
only is a condition precedent to antidilution relief, but it is only that quality that
is to be protected. Thus, it is important to define what that distinctive quality is
in order to determine what a plaintiff must establish before he will be entitled to
section 368-d injunctive relief.
Although the New York statute will protect a mark's distinctive quality, the
statute offers no indication as to what that term means. 12 4 Although some
commentators urge that all valid marks possess a distinctive quality, 1 s still
others believe that antidilution protection should be limited to coined, fanciful,
or arbitrary marks. 126 One writer believes protection should be accorded cele-
brated marks, 127 while another would apply the doctrine to coined or fanciful
marks, as well as to those marks that have acquired a secondary meaning. 12
In addition to the competing opinions offered by the academicians, the New
York courts themselves have struggled in their attempt to define a distinctive
quality. Most New York courts that have been confronted with section 368-d
have avoided any attempt to define the term. 129 One supreme court decision
determined that all marks that acquire a secondary meaning possess distinc-
tiveness 130 while another supreme court decision limited the dilution doctrine
to fanciful and unique marks. 131 Presented with these varying opinions on the
definition of distinctiveness, the court of appeals, in Allied, relied upon both the
legislative intent in enacting section 368-d and the interpretation of a similar
statute in Massachusetts.1 32
124. Neither the statute nor the annotated Notes appurtenant thereto define the term. See N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1968).
125. See, e.g., Lunsford, Trademarks: Dilution and Deception, 63 Trademark Rep. 41, 53-SS
(1973).
126. See, e.g., Schechter, supra note 4, at 828 (advocating a broad degree of protection for these
marks).
127. See Derenberg, supra note 66, at 451. A mark is celebrated when it has entered into the
language of a people with a definite and single significance. Becher, The Protection of Well-known
Trade-marks, 42 Trademark Rep. 606, 607 (1952).
128. See Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 530.
129. See, e.g., Rainbow Ranch Corp. v. Rainbow Shops, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 803, 812, 392
N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (statute quoted, but distinctiveness not defined); The Shadow
Box, Inc. v. Drecq, 71 Misc. 2d 733, 734, 336 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (same); Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 72 Misc. 2d 847, 860 n.6, 340
N.Y.S.2d 532, 548-49 n.7 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (distinctiveness not defined, although equated with
marks that are fanciful or unique); Tiffany & Co. v. L'Argene Prods. Co., 67 Misc. 2d 384, 389, 324
N.Y.S.2d 326, 330 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (distinctiveness equated with uniqueness); Pocket Books, Inc. v.
Dell Publishing Co., 49 Misc. 2d 252, 255, 267 N.Y.S.2d 269, 273 (Sup. CL 1966) (court acknowl-
edged that defendant must dilute a distinctive quality); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staff Supermarket
Assoc., Inc., 44 Misc. 2d 634, 635, 254 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (distinctiveness not
mentioned); Clairol Inc. v. L.H. Martin Value Center, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 875, 876, 244 N.Y.S.2d
210, 211 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (same).
130. Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 45 Misc. 2d 161, 168, 256 N.Y.S.2d 239,
246 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 829, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1965).
131. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 72 Misc. 2d
847, 860 n.6, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 548-49 n.7 (Sup. CL 1972).
132. See 42 N.Y.2d at 544-45, 369 N.E.2d at 1165-66, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The Massachu-
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In enacting section 368-d, the New York legislature emphasized that the
scope of the section would encompass famous trademarks. 133 "Dupont shoes,"
"Buick aspirin tablets," "Schlitz varnish," and "Kodak pianos," are offered as
examples of the improper use of a distinctive, established mark which the
legislature sought to enjoin. 134 In each example, the mark or name is not only
famous in that it is recognized by a large segment of the public, 13S but the mark
also contains an element of inventiveness-it was coined by its creator. 136 The
quality of inventiveness, the court of appeals noted, was also present in the
decisions of the courts in Massachusetts, which "have required a showing that
the trade-mark or name to be protected is either unique or has acquired a
secondary meaning before issuing an injunction. ' 137 In the absence of a statu-
tory definition, therefore, the Allied court determined that for a plaintiff to
merit protection he must possess a mark that is either "unique," "coined,"
"arbitrary," "fanciful," 138 or has "acquired a secondary meaning."' 139
In Allied, the court of appeals noted that the term "Allied" was a weak trade
name, one which, by definition, had already been diluted. 140 As opposed to
setts statute, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. ll0B, § 12 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975), provides: "Likelihood of
injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark registered under this
chapter, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground
for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence
of confusion as to the source of goods or services."
133. 1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 49.
134. Id.
135. The word "famous" is not a trademark term of art. See, e.g., 74 Am. Jur.2d Trademarks
and Tradenames § 58 (1974). The word is, instead, intended to be used in its colloquial sense. See
1954 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49, 49.
136. As to coined marks generally, see 74 Am. Jur. 2d Trademark and Tradenames § 49 (1974);
3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 71.1(c), at 139; note 137 infra.
137. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632. Coined, arbitrary, or
fanciful words or terms are those that are the product of invention, however slight, and are not
descriptive of the article in question or its origin. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 77.1, at 337. Such
words add to, rather than delimit, the human vocabulary, are associated in the public mind with a
particular product, rather than with a variety of products, and create in the public consciousness an
image of the excellence of the particular product in question. Schechter, supra note 4, at 829.
Examples are words such as "Kodak," "Mazda," "Nujol," and "Rolls-Royce." Id.
Secondary meaning "contemplates that a word or phrase originally ... incapable of exclusive
appropriation with reference to an article on the market, because geographically or otherwise
descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with
reference to his article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or
phrase had come to mean that the article was his product." G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F.
369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912), aff'd and modified on other grounds sub nom. Saalfield Publishing Co. v.
G. & C. Merriam Co., 238 F. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917). The Allied court noted
that "to establish secondary meaning it must be shown that through exclusive use and advertising
by one entity, a name or mark has become so associated in the mind of the public with that entity or
its product that it identifies the goods sold by that entity and distinguishes them from goods sold by
others." 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 633 (citation omitted).
138. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.V.S.2d at 632; see note 137 supra.
139. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33; see note 137 supra.
140. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
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being distinctive, the term was categorized as "generic" or "descriptive,"'' 4' a
common word in English usage today. "There is nothing in the name 'Allied
Maintenance' itself," the court stated, "which indicates that it is an inherently
strong trade name susceptible to dilution. ' 1 4 2 Similarly, the court of appeals
found that the name "Allied Maintenance" lacked any secondary meaning.
Because the New York phone book contained at least 300 businesses incor-
porating the word "allied" into their trade name, the plaintiff's name had not
become so associated in the mind of the public that it was readily identifiable
with plaintiff's business to the exclusion of others. ' 43 Concluding that plaintiffs
name lacked any distinctive quality as defined by the court, injunctive relief
was summarily denied. 14
By defining trademark distinctiveness, however, as a quality of "uniqueness"
or "secondary meaning", the Allied court has failed to identify properly the
interest which the dilution doctrine protects. As noted above, t4S that interest is
defined as the selling power that only certain trademarks or names possess. It is
that power and value which make those marks distinctive and separate them
from all other marks and names, and it is only that power which the dilution
doctrine seeks to protect.' 46 A mark that is fanciful, or a word that has ac-
quired secondary meaning, however, does not necessarily possess a distinctive
quality. 147 The terms "fanciful," "arbitrary," or "coined," are used to distin-
guish a particular type of mark from a word or term which does not identify a
particular product and thus is not capable of being appropriated as a trademark
141. Id. A "generic" or "descriptive" word is one that identifies objects, rather than source of
origin. The distinction between generic and descriptive terms is a matter of degree. A descriptive
mark identifies a particular feature of the product---"Dry Ice," "Spin Dry,"--while a generic mark
identifies ageneral feature--"Old Country," "Sports Show." 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 70.4, at
111, § 71.1(a), at 115-28.
142. 42 N.Y.2d at 545, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
143. Id. at 546, 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
144. Id. The dissent would have granted plaintiff an injunction based upon the acquisition of
secondary meaning. See id. at 548, 369 N.E.2d at 1167-68, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 634 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting). The dissent contended that in determining the distinctiveness of plaintiff's mark by
reviewing the pages of a local phone directory, the majority "may be read as limiting... [§ 368-di
to the protection of only the most well-known names." Id. at 548, 369 N.E.2d at 1168, 399
N.Y.S.2d at 634 (Cooke, J., dissenting). However, when a less well-known name associated with a
particular business is appropriated by another in a closely related field, the dissent continued, the
resulting dilution is of no less significance to the particular plaintiff than would be the use of an
extremely well-known, established trade name by a distinctly unrelated business. Id. at 549, 369
N.E.2d at 1168, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 635. Emphasizing that the statute was intended to codify New
York common law, Judge Cooke argued that a review of those cases indicated that § 368-d was not
intended to be limited to protection of only well-known marks and names. Id. Consequently,
because the trial term found that plaintiff's name had long been associated by the public with
plaintiff, Judge Cooke would have granted the injunction, despite the fact that plaintiff's name was
not very well-known. Id.
145. See notes 67-77 supra and accompanying text.
146. See 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 954-55; Pattishall, supra note 53, at 630;
Schechter, supra note 4, at 823-25; notes 167-70 infra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 157-59 infra and accompanying text.
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of trade name. 148 Similarly, a word which has acquired secondary meaning is
one that, although not originally susceptible of exclusive appropriation as a
mark or name, has become so associated in the minds of purchasers with the
source of origin of goods or services that it achieves the status of a mark or trade
name. 149 Consequently, fanciful marks or words that have acquired a second-
ary meaning simply identify the article or service to which they are applied, and
do not necessarily sell that article or service. 150 Protection of the identifying
function of marks or names, however, is the purpose of traditional trademark
law, and not of the dilution doctrine. 151 When the Allied court, therefore,
defined distinctiveness in terms of a mark's basic source identification function,
it reverted to protection of that interest properly covered by actions for trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition and disregarded a trademark own-
er's commercial interest in the selling power of his mark per se.
The Allied court's definition of distinctiveness in terms of a coined or unique
mark or a mark that is possessed of secondary meaning is also defective because
it applies the dilution theory to a distinctive mark or name rather than to the
distinctive quality of a mark or name. Were the dilution theory applied, for
example, to coined or arbitrary marks, however, a "bounty" of trademark
protection would be paid by the law for the coining or inventing of a mark or
name. 1-2 Not only would such a "bounty" have no social or commercial jus-
tification, 153 but it would also necessarily require rather subjective exam-
inations by the courts into the novelty of words and terms "with all their
attendant pitfalls of error, contradiction and unpredictability. '15 4 The New
York statute, in seeking to protect marks that are strong-those capable of
being diluted-does not limit antidilution protection to a category of marks or
names. The language of section 368-d looks to the protection of a "distinctive
quality," and not a distinctive mark.15 5 Under such a rule, no particular cate-
148. See 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 77.1; Annot., 74 Am. Jur. 2d Trademarks and
Tradenames § 49 (1974); note 136 supra.
149. See 74 Am. Jur. 2d Trademarks and Tradenames § 64 (1974); note 137 supra.
150. As noted earlier, see note 53 supra and accompanying text, every mark identifies source of
origin. Whether a mark is fanciful or arbitrary, or one possessed of secondary meaning, simply
describes the manner in which that mark identifies. See generally 74 Am. Jur. 2d Trademarks and
Tradenames §§ 49, 64 (1974).
151. See notes 53-64 supra and accompanying text.
152. Pattishall, supra note 53, at 630. If the dilution doctrine were extended to coined or unique
marks, a trademark owner would seek to have his mark or name so classified in order to have that
mark protected against dilution. As a result, the doctrine would protect the classification of a mark
rather than the mark's selling power. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. § 368-d of the General Business Law offers injunctive relief in cases "of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1968). Dr. Schechter
defines this quality as that which enables the mark or name to deeply "impress upon the public
consciousness." Schechter, supra note 4, at 825. That ability-to impress deeply upon the con-
sciousness of the public-was described as "commercial magnetism" by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942). "The protection
of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we
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gory of marks is included specifically and none is excluded. 15 6
Whether a mark's distinctiveness stems from its uniqueness or from its sec-
ondary meaning should be immaterial to the dilution question. 15 7 All that is, or
should be, required is that the mark possess the requisite distinctive "quality."
This quality is not an abstract question of invention, or of coining, or of
singularity of words, letters, devices, or any combination thereof. The question
of distinctiveness, instead, turns upon what the mark signified to those who
have encountered it commercially. '- 8 This is a fact question of the state of mind
of the relevant market.159 By applying the dilution doctrine to a particular
mark, therefore, the Allied court has failed to recognize the true impact of
distinctiveness-its effect upon the consumer.
IV. DEFINING DILUTION
Although the Allied opinion addressed the questions of how far the dilution
doctrine should extend and what the elements of that doctrine are, it remains
for the court to define more precisely just what dilution means. Relying upon
the legislative intent behind the enactment of section 368-d, 160 the Allied court
defined dilution as "the whittling away of an established trade-mark's selling
power and value through its unauthorized use."'16 An analysis of this defini-
tion, however, was not offered by the court. 162 Furthermore, an examination of
prior New York dilution cases reveals that no New York court, confronted
with an antidilution action, has analyzed the concept any further than to note
that it is a watering down of a mark's value. 163 The concept of "whittling away
live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he
wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate
the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means
employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers,
the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark
owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he
has created, the owner can obtain legal redress." Id. at 205; see Deering, Trademarks on Noncom-
petitive Products, 36 Ore. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1956).
156. See Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 540, 543 (Ist Cir. 1957); Exquisite
Form Indus., Inc. v. Exquisite Fabrics of London, 378 F. Supp. 403, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
157. Pattishan, supra note 53, at 630.
158. Until a mark is used it does not possess a distinctive quality capable of injury. Id. at 631.
159. Cf. Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler Corp., 85 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1936) (L.
Hand, J.) ("The proprietary connotation,---'secondary meaning,'-of a word of common speech is
harder to create and easier to lose, and its fringe or penumbra does not usually extend so far as that
of a coined word. But that is a matter of proof and of that alone; if the owner can in fact show that
the fringe does extend to other goods there is no reason why his interest should not be recognized.').
160. 42 N.Y.2d at 542, 369 N.E.2d at 1164, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
161. Id. (quoting N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49 (1954)).
162. Because the court found that the plaintiff's name lacked any distinctiveness-the first
requirement in an antidilution action-the court never reached the issue of whether any distinc-
tiveness was diluted. Consequently, an analysis of dilution was not necessary for the court's
determination.
163. See, e.g., Clairol Inc. v. Carlton Drug, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 652 (1967) (mem.); Rainbow
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[a mark's] selling power, '164 however, is a nebulous one, and one that requires
defining in order to aid the court in correctly applying section 368-d. 165
As indicated above, 166 the dilution doctrine is a comparatively new depar-
ture in American trademark law, which hitherto had been limited exclusively
to the protection of the identifying function of marks and names and which
recognized no rights of the owner in that mark apart from the source identifying
function. The dilution doctrine, as set forth in the New York statute, seems
premised upon a quasi-property right in the mark's distinctive quality, since
section 368-d prohibits any use of a mark or name that is likely to dilute that
quality. 167 Because the courts and commentators equate distinctiveness with
the selling power inherent in certain marks themselves, 168 the dilution doctrine
is actually designed to protect the trademark owner's rights in the power of his
mark to sell his product or service. 169 Once this selling power is defined,
Ranch Corp. v. Rainbow Shops, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 808, 392 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1977); The
Shadow Box, Inc. v. Drecq, 71 Misc. 2d 733, 336 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 72 Misc. 2d 847, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup.
Ct. 1972); Tiffany & Co. v. L'Argene Prod. Co., 67 Misc. 2d 384, 324 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct.
1971); Pocket Books, Inc. v. Dell Publishing Co., 49 Misc. Zd 252, 267 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct.
1966); Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 45 Misc. 2d 161, 256 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mem., 23 App. Div. 2d 829, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1965); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staff
Supermarket Assocs., Inc., 44 Misc. 2d 634, 254 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Clairol Inc. v. L.
H. Martin Value Center, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 875, 244 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1963); McGraw-Hill
Book Co. v. Random House, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 704, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
164. 42 N.Y.2d at 542, 399 N.E.2d at 1164, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 630 (quoting N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49
(1954)).
165. Pattishall criticizes the absence of a statutory definition of dilution-in all state statutes--
and notes that that absence explains the courts' reluctance to apply the statutes as they read.
Pattishall, supra note 53, at 627.
166. See notes 53-66 supra and accompanying text.
167. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1968); see Pattishall, supra note 53, at 629.
168. See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text.
169. Callmann notes that judicial reluctance to accept the dilution doctrine is perhaps premised
upon this "trademark as property" notion. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 956. He notes
that courts that have recognized any property rights in a mark have qualified the nature of that
right: "[A] trade-mark is not property in the ordinary sense but only a word or symbol indicating the
origin of a commercial product. The owner of the mark acquires the right to prevent the goods to
which the mark is applied from being confused with those of others and to prevent his own trade
from being diverted to competitors through their use of misleading marks. There are no rights in a
trademark beyond these." Id. § 66.3, at 34 (quoting from Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess
Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1937) (A. N. Hand, J.) ). The erroneous conclusion that a
mark or name has no property value independent of its identification function, he continues, Is
attributable to judicial emphasis upon the concept that a trademark is the symbol of goodwill. Id.
at 36. Consequently, any theory of trademark protection that does not focus upon this function will
inevitably meet judicial hesitance. Id.
Callmann notes further that judicial unwillingness to accept the dilution doctrine is also attribut-
able to "an understandable antipathy to modern advertising." Id. § 84.2, at 960. Certainly a
substantial percentage of today's advertising outlay is spent cultivating a "conditioned reflex devel-
oped in the buyer by imaginative or often purely monotonous selling of the mark itself." Deering,
supra note 155, at 2. The advertising value which the mark achieved thereby is jeopardized by
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therefore, the concept of "[diluting the] distinctive quality of a mark or trade
name" 170 becomes readily understandable.
The advertising and selling power of a mark or name is composed of two
components. A mark or name may sell a product through its product-evoking
power, or through its ability to convey affirmative mental associations in the
mind of the consumer. 171 The product-evoking power of a mark or name sells
inasmuch as it creates, in the mind of the public, images of a particular product
or service ("Budweiser" plaintiff's beer). 172 Unlike the source identifying func-
tion of a mark ("Budweiser": a product manufactured by plaintiff) which is
preserved through actions for trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion, 17 3 the product evoking power of a distinctive mark or name does not
identify the source from which a product or service originates, but identifies the
product itself.174
In addition to the power of a mark to conjure up thoughts of, for example,
beer, that mark or name may also create a desire for a product by conveying
positive mental associations to the consumer.17 5 This component of selling
power recognizes that a mark can sell a particular product by creating a desire
for product satisfaction. While "Budweiser" has the ability to evoke images of
beer, that mark may also convey images of a tasty or enjoyable glass of beer,
and thereby create a desire for further satisfactions. 176
To establish a right to antidilution protection, therefore, an owner ought to
be required to establish that his mark evokes either product, as opposed to
source, identification, or affirmative mental associations in the mind of a sub-
stantial percentage of consumers in the relevant market. If the owner can
establish that his mark has achieved the first characteristic, he can prove
dilution of his mark by establishing that his mark no longer evokes images of
his product in the minds of consumers who now associate it with other products
as well. 177 Any second use, therefore, may be presumed to dilute product
identification because the use of plaintiff's mark, or one similar to his mark,
upon any other product will necessarily "whittle away" the power of that mark
to identify plaintiff's product alone, and will thus dilute its hold upon the public
mind. 178 If, however, the owner relies upon his mark's ability to convey
affirmative associations, it would be incumbent upon him to prove that the
defendant has tarnished such associations by attaching the mark to inferior
dilution. Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 522. Any antipathy directed towards modern advertising
is thus going to be directed against the advertising value of a trademark or trade name. See 3 R.
Callmann, supra note 3, § 84.2, at 960. See also Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165 (1948).
170. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1968).
171. See Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 521-22.
172. Id.
173. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
174. See Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 522.
175. Id.
176. Id.




products, or to products with negative connotations that create associations
capable of reducing consumer acceptance of plaintiffs product. 179 In some
cases, as where the mark is used upon wholly inferior goods, a plaintiff may
decide not to prove product identification, choosing instead to show dilution via
tarnishment of affirmative associations. In other cases, as where the owner
himself applies his mark to a diverse list of goods, product identification may be
difficult to prove, and the tarnishment approach will be the only avenue of
dilution relief available.
The Allied decision represents a triumph of realism over form. It is a decision
based upon common commercial sense and recognition of valuable commercial
interests. The case is representative of a trend in trademark law towards pro-
tection of an owner's reliance upon his trademark or trade name's selling
power.
As a result of this decision, a trademark owner will clearly no longer have to
prove the existence of a likelihood of confusion or competition to merit injunc-
tive relief under section 368-d of the New York General Business Law. Pro-
vided a plaintiff can establish trademark distinctiveness and dilution of that
quality he will have framed a dilution complaint.
Judicial understanding and defining of the elements of both distinctiveness
and dilution however is necessary to refine the Allied decision and, conse-
quently, properly apply the directives of the New York statute. Allied, a first
step in the direction of judicial recognition of an antidilution action, will per-
haps mark the beginning of the courts' willingness to further spell out the
nature of dilution and its concomitant protection of a mark's distinctive quality.
If so, Allied may well mark the end of "fuzzy thinking about the nature of
[dilution], careless draftsmanship of statutes purporting to express a legislative
choice, and misplaced judicial ingenuity."' 8 0
Stephan J. Feder
179. In Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963), the defendant was able to enjoin the maker of an insect repellant
from advertising "Where there's life ... there's bugs," a modified version of the famous Budweiser
slogan. After paying lipservice to the confusion requirement, the court said it sought to prevent loss
arising from this "peculiarly unwholesome association of ideas." Id. at 437.
180. Harvard Note, supra note 65, at 532.
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